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This study examines the perceptions of local stakeholders about the effectiveness of Farm 
Bill working lands incentives in the Schuylkill River Watershed in southeastern 
Pennsylvania. Farmers and program implementers were interviewed about program 
characteristics that are perceived as effective, gaps and inconsistencies across the full 
system of conservation incentives, and the actual or potential value of emerging strategies 
to maximize program performance, encourage management-intensive conservation, and 
reward stewardship. Such strategies, often associated with the “green payments” concept, 
strongly influenced the 2002 Farm Bill and its enactment of the Conservation Security 
Program (CSP). Since Schuylkill River Watershed farmers had the opportunity to 
participate in CSP in 2005, interviewees were asked about the usefulness of, and 
obstacles to implementing, the innovative components of CSP. Finally, this study also 
examined the relevance of federal programs to local conservation priorities, with special 
focus given to the effectiveness of NRCS programs in furthering the Schuylkill River 
Watershed’s water quality objectives. 
Interviews were conducted with seven farmers with diverse operations and conservation 
program involvement histories (six of whom participated in CSP), seven implementers of 
Farm Bill programs (both NRCS and County Conservation District agents), and several 
implementers of water quality conservation efforts on agricultural land (led by local non-
profits, the EPA, and the state of Pennsylvania). Interviews covered the perceptions of 1) 
the most important local resource concerns, 2) the best practices for addressing those 
issues and barriers to such practices, 3) the effectiveness of the full range of available 
conservation programs in promoting the best practices and addressing priority resource 
concerns, and 4) the value of emerging program strategies to reward stewardship 
payments, emphasize management rather than structural conservation practices, and 
increase conservation performance. 
Several themes emerged from the interviews. First, all participants were deeply 
concerned about low NRCS staffing levels. Insufficient staffing appears to have serious 
consequences for basic program delivery, conservation planning, and management-
intensive conservation initiatives. Farmers also expressed strong desires for more 
sophisticated technical assistance to address complex management challenges. Second, 
Farm Bill conservation investments do not appear to directly target locally important 
conservation objectives, nor do they appear to stimulate significant improvements in 
nutrient management practices, the most critical ingredient for improved water quality in 
the Schuylkill River Watershed. Third, respondents revealed a dearth of contract 
enforcement and program evaluation activity, both of which hinder the potential of 
performance-based programs. Fourth, farmers shared deep frustrations with the tendency 
of Farm Bill programs to provide more ample rewards for poor stewards than for good 
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ones. Fifth, CSP was criticized for many problems: for perpetuating inequitable payments 
between longstanding versus new stewardship commitments, for extremely limited 
outreach and sign up periods, for not having a continual presence in the same watershed, 
and for staffing levels too low to ensure accountability. Simultaneously, interviewees 
believed a stewardship payments program like CSP, if improved, has potential to create 
stronger incentives and more equity in the NRCS conservation program portfolio. Finally, 
farmers expressed tentative support for the “greening” of income support by shifting 
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This study examines the perceptions of farmers and program implementers about the 
effectiveness of federal agricultural working lands conservation programs in the 
Schuylkill River Watershed in southeastern Pennsylvania. A primary goal of the project 
was to gain insights—from those with ground-level experience of NRCS (Natural 
Resources Conservation Service) program implementation—into the actual or potential 
efficacy of strategies to maximize program performance and reward stewardship.  
The Policy Context 
Several approaches to maximize environmental outcomes, or performance, have been 
advocated by agricultural economists and policy analysts over the last decade or two, 
some of which have begun to influence the form of federal working lands programs 
(Helms, 2003). Some strategies, described by such terms as performance-based (Claassen 
et al., 2001; Weinberg and Claassen, 2006), whole farm (Batie, 1994), and management-
intensive (SWCS/ED 2007a; SAC, 2006) conservation planning, aim to improve 
outcomes and cost effectiveness at the scale of the individual farm. Other approaches 
focus on how best to target investments to gain measurable environmental improvements 
at larger scales for key natural resources and regions (Westra et al., 2004; Batie 1994). 
Examples include watershed-based program implementation (USDA NRCS, publication 
date unknown; Wu, 2004; HAWCAEP, 2001), geographic targeting of resources to select 
regions where critical improvements are needed (Wu, 2004; Hansen, 2006; USDA, 2006a; 
Batie, 1994), funding allocations by priority resource concerns (Zhao, 2004), and awards 
for cooperative efforts with participation of such stakeholders as farmers, non-profits, 
universities, and/or government agencies at local, state, and federal levels (SWCS/ED 
2007a; SAC, 2006). 
The focus on environmental performance has paralleled discussions about how to reform 
the Nation’s agricultural subsidy system so financial rewards are based on environmental 
stewardship rather than commodity production. Green payments is the term used to 
describe proposals that attempt to merge the objectives of farmer income support with 
incentives for conservation (Claassen and Morehart, 2006). Based on the assumption that 
farming should not be environmentally destructive, and that win-win solutions that invest 
in both farmers and our natural resources are possible, green payment approaches seek to 
pay for the value of a farmer’s stewardship. (Helm, 2003)  
Those advocating measures to reward stewardship and improve the environmental 
performance of federal programs have won numerous victories since the passage of the 
1985 Farm Bill, which ushered in “conservation compliance” (Helms, 2003). Requiring 
farmers to conserve soil and wetlands in exchange for commodity subsidies, conservation 
compliance measures were the first attempt to tie together farm income support and 
conservation goals (Claassen and Morehart, 2006). Since 1985, Farm Bill revisions have 
also established several new conservation programs (Helms, 2003), dramatically 
expanded conservation budgets (Clarren, 2007), and shifted the emphasis from land 
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retirement programs toward working lands programs (Helms, 2003; USDA, 2006a; 
Lichtenberg, 2004). New mandates for geographic and resource targeting (Helms, 2003; 
Claassen et al., 2001; SWCS/ED, 2007a), funding allocation criteria (Hansen, 2006; 
SWCS/ED, 2007a), and cooperative conservation requirements (USDAb, publication 
date unknown, SWCS/ED, 2007a) also attempt to raise the level of environmental 
performance from program investments.  
The enactment of the Conservation Security Program (CSP) in the 2002 Farm Bill has 
been hailed by many in the conservation community as a major step toward green 
payments (Helm, 2003; Zhao, 2004; Kemp, 2005). CSP was designed to reward existing 
stewardship and to do so in proportion to the conservation value of stewardship practices. 
These two qualities—rewarding ongoing stewardship and performance-based (rather than 
cost-based) payments—are what distinguish CSP from prior NRCS conservation 
programs that simply provided cost-share payments in exchange for agreements to 
implement future conservation practices (Helms, 2003, Weinberg and Claassen, 2006; 
Johansson, 2006). In addition, a little recognized, but important clause of the CSP statute 
provides for enhanced payments for farmers who address locally-defined conservation 
priorities, participate in cooperative watershed or regional conservation efforts, or carry 
out environmental monitoring of rewarded practices. 
With two decades of conservation advocacy efforts realized in so many ways at the 
federal policy level, this study offers an opportunity to discover how these changes 
carried through the agricultural conservation system to shape the effectiveness of 
conservation incentives as experienced and perceived by local stakeholders.  
The Schuylkill River Watershed 
The setting for this study was driven by initial support from the Northeast-Midwest 
Institute and the William Penn Foundation. The Northeast-Midwest Institute was 
interested in the potential of CSP in the broader system of agricultural conservation 
incentives and as a precursor to future green payments reforms. The Schuylkill River 
Watershed implemented CSP in 2005, the second year of the program. In addition, the 
William Penn Foundation, who provided support to the Northeast-Midwest Institute and 
this project, had funded many conservation efforts in the Schuylkill and was particularly 
interested in the relationship between locally and federally-driven efforts affecting 
agricultural land.  
The Schuylkill Watershed is an unusually rich community in which to conduct this study. 
Agriculture is central to the area’s history and culture. A sizeable Amish community 
continues to farm throughout the region, and Berks County—the central county of the 
watershed—is famous for its farmland preservation policies (AFT, 2005). Because the 
watershed is a major production center for the Philadelphia, New York, and D.C. markets, 
Schuylkill farmers operate a wide variety of farm types, especially cash crop and 
livestock operations, but also orchards, vegetable and horse farms (NASS, 2004).  
The Watershed also hosts a diverse mix of activities to improve farm stewardship and 
reduce agricultural non-point source pollution. As the drinking water source for the 1.5 
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million residents of Philadelphia, the Schuylkill River is the target of several initiatives to 
improve water quality (PWD, 2002). Because agricultural sources comprise 30% of non-
point source pollution in the watershed, several regional and national efforts focus on 
reducing pollution from farms (PWD, 2002). In addition, the Schuylkill Watershed was 
selected for implementation of CSP in 2005, the program’s second year. This wealth of 
programmatic efforts to promote conservation practices on working land combined with 
the richness of the agricultural sector make the Schuylkill River Watershed a unique area 
in which to study perceptions of conservation program performance. 
The Study’s Evolution and Rationale 
While many studies have analyzed data or stakeholder input related to a particular 
program (Lundgren et al., 2006; Heller et al., 2005, SWCS/ED 2007b; Batie 2006), few 
have sought the points of view of farmers and local implementers on the strengths and 
gaps (as they experience it at the local level) in the full system of working lands 
conservation programs. I deliberately cast a wide net on the question of conservation 
program effectiveness for a couple reasons.  
Though I was very interested in the ambitious aims of CSP, it was already clear two years 
into implementation that CSP was struggling to realize its potential (Lundgren et al., 
2006; Heller et al., 2005), a situation typically attributed to severely constrained program 
funding (Johnson 2004a; Heller, 2005; Lundgren, 2006). Some of the early critiques of 
program implementation (Heller, 2005; Lundgren, 2006) however, seemed to suggest to 
me that there were other sources of problems, perhaps arising from the statutory language, 
gaps in NRCS infrastructure, and NRCS organizational norms that made some of the 
novel components of the program—and perhaps of any performance-based stewardship 
program—difficult to implement. Consequently, I wanted to learn more about the 
perceived value of, as well as obstacles to implementing, innovative measures like those 
incorporated in CSP. Since these measures were intended to resolve important gaps in the 
suite of established conservation programs, and perhaps, to even provide models for 
larger-scale green payments programs, understanding their inherent strengths and 
weaknesses seemed important.1 
I knew the richest data would come from interviews, and from questions that are broad 
and inclusive. I wanted to mine participant’s perspectives for clues as to what works, 
what does not, and why. I wondered what their thoughts were on the national policy 
debates that shaped the programs delivered in their communities. Did local stakeholders 
see value in the key strategies that informed CSP and are continuing to drive changes 
within the Farm Bill programs? I also wanted to hear how effectively the suite of federal 
                                                 
1 Note: I also considered evaluating the environmental performance of CSP and other programs in the 
Schuylkill against locally-defined conservation objectives. With data on the types of practices funded by 
NRCS and the location of improvements, several GIS-based simulation programs can aid in estimation of 
environmental outcomes (Smith and Weinberg, 2004). As it turned out, however, it is nearly impossible to 
obtain spatially referenced program data—at least in a reasonable time frame—from NRCS due to agency 
procedures to protect the confidentiality of farmers receiving federal investments. This is, apparently, not 
an uncommon obstacle for researchers (Batie, 2007), and creates a very serious barrier to critical 
environmental performance research. 
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programs were building upon and furthering local efforts such as the water quality 
initiatives taking place in the Schuylkill. 
While a case study of this nature cannot produce statistically meaningful data to test 
hypotheses, nor can the findings be generalized to all agricultural regions, it can offer 
insight into the views of recipients of federal conservation program funds and serve as the 
basis for generating hypotheses. Furthermore, by not focusing on a specific program, but, 
instead, on the suite of tools available to farmers and implementers, the interviews can 
shed light on the gaps and inconsistencies in the system of programs intended to create 
incentives for conservation. 
I believe this study will prove useful for a range of policy professionals who are currently 
working to improve the delivery of agricultural conservation programs through the 2007 
Farm Bill drafting process and beyond. The first hand experiences of farmers and local 
implementers are essential to understanding whether program intentions are discernable 
at the point of program delivery, yet these voices are rarely at the front of the policy 
debates and program design discussions. Many concerns raised by participants in this 
study corroborate recommendations made by policy advocates. Others, however, reveal 
discrepancies between policy goals and actual implementation, typically resulting from 
distortions that occur throughout the program implementation chain. Such distortions 
limit the success of the most thoughtful, ambitious, and innovative policy goals, and must 
be understood if policy designers hope to realize their goals.  
The Study’s Structure 2  
The analysis presented in this report comes from interviews of seven farmers who 
participated in CSP and other agricultural conservation programs and seven implementers 
of those programs (staff of NRCS and County Conservation District offices). Additional 
interviews took place with staff of water quality agencies who were involved in local 
agricultural conservation programs. Interview themes are contextualized against an 
extensive review of literature by academic researchers, policy analysts, and advocates on 
the Farm Bill, particular programs, agricultural conservation best management practices, 
program design elements, and the national green payments discussion.  
The following set of broad, open-ended questions was used to discern what strategies 
stakeholders considered effective—and effective for accomplishing what—among the 
range of working lands conservation programs. 
• What are the local conservation objectives and the best practices for addressing them? 
• What are the incentives and barriers farmers have to implementing these practices? 
• What programs are most effective in motivating farmers to implement these practices?  
• What characteristics make programs effective, or prevent them from being effective? 
• How is it known what is most effective? How are results measured? 
• Are federal programs responsive to the local priorities? 
                                                 
2 A comprehensive description of the interview methodology and participants begins on page 19.  
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• How was CSP similar to or different than other programs? What value did it have 
relative to other programs? 
• To what extent are interviewees aware of the national “green payments” (commodity 
replacement) discussion? What are their opinions? 
• What’s missing from the available conservation incentives?  
This report summarizes the key ideas and concerns raised by farmers and implementers. 
Study participants had strong opinions and concerns about the resource concerns and 
practices that are relevant for their region, the scarcity of on-farm technical assistance and 
inadequacy of available assistance for the complex challenge of whole farm planning, 
and the viability of agriculture in the face of enormous residential development pressure. 
They also raised concerns about the apparent difficulty of cooperation between various 
organizations working on agricultural conservation and the perversity of the current 
system of subsidies and conservation payments that seems to provide more ample 
rewards for poor stewards than for good ones. 
I conclude the report with a discussion of the relevance of these findings in the context of 
proposals advocated by policy analysts. Preliminary recommendations are provided for 
changes that could strengthen the federal conservation portfolio, provide solutions to 
some of the gaps and disincentives in the system, and foster the infrastructure needed to 
support more sweeping reforms. Other issues raise more questions than they answer. In 
these instances, hypotheses for further testing are suggested. 
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2. Background 
 
THE FEDERAL POLICY CONTEXT 
Reauthorized by Congress every five to six years, the Farm Bill provides the statutory 
framework and budget for the U. S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) farm subsidy 
and conservation system (Clarren, 2007). Subsidies and other income support programs 
are primarily administered through the USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA). The 
USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), in conjunction with partner 
organizations such as the County Conservation Districts, holds primary responsibility for 
implementing Farm Bill conservation programs and assisting private landowners to 
conserve natural resources. Though other federal agencies, such as the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), implement conservation programs that involve 
private landowners, the Farm Bill is “the largest single source of federal funding for 
conservation on private land” (Clarren, 2007). 
History 
Until 1985, Farm Bill conservation programs focused almost entirely on conserving soil 
to sustain agricultural productivity, a priority established during the dust storms of the 
1930s (Claassen et al., 2001; Clarren, 2007). Through extensive research into production 
systems for reducing erosion, demonstration projects, and aggressive farmer education 
efforts, soil conservation programs were successful in reducing erosion problems 
(Lichtenberg, 2004; Clarren, 2007).  
Discussions about new conservation priorities and policies—during the height of the 
environmental movement in the 1970s and 80s—initiated a wave of changes to Farm Bill 
legislation. With the formation of the EPA in 1970 and passage of the Endangered 
Species Act in 1973, greater attention was directed to the impacts of agriculture on water 
quality and wildlife habitat (Clarren, 2007). Federal agricultural subsidies came under 
much greater scrutiny by representatives of academia, conservation groups, and 
government agencies, who pushed for subsidy reform and a much stronger conservation 
mandate for the USDA.  
That mandate was won in the form of the 1977 Soil and Water Resources Conservation 
Act (RCA), legislation which directed the USDA to track the status and trends of soil, 
water, and other natural resources, and to develop appropriate conservation programs to 
address environmental problems (Helms, 2003). The debate surrounding this victory has 
been viewed as the beginning of the green payments movement (Helms, 2003). It set the 
stage for numerous conservation advances in subsequent Farm Bills and three decades of 
continuing agricultural policy reform debate. The following chronology highlights key 
developments in the history to win improved stewardship incentives and conservation 
program performance. These are the key themes investigated in this study and that 
underpin the ongoing push for green payments reforms currently influencing the debate 
of the 2007 Farm Bill.  
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Food Security Act of 1985:  
Merging Farmer Support with Conservation Goals and Emphasizing Performance 
By the mid-1980s, many recognized that the commodity subsidy programs and other 
farm income support (loans and crop insurance) induced production patterns that 
degraded soil and water quality, and, therefore, conflicted with the objectives of USDA’s 
conservation mandate (Claassen et al., 2001). The 1985 Farm Bill (the Food Security 
Act) was the first to explicitly recognize this inconsistency and to take steps to reconcile 
it by instituting conservation compliance provisions and the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) (Claassen et al., 2001, Claassen and Morehart, 2006). These changes 
have been considered early steps towards green payments reforms of agricultural policy 
(Claassen and Morehart, 2006; Helms, 2003), and the conservation compliance 
provisions serve as a useful template—even today—for future reforms. 
Conservation compliance requirements were designed to minimize the temptation of 
farmers to crop environmentally sensitive lands (Helms, 2003). As a condition of 
eligibility for commodity and other income support programs, they required farmers to 
meet a minimum standard of conservation—using effective soil conservation systems on 
highly erodible land and not converting wetlands to agricultural production. These two 
provisions, commonly referred to as “Sodbuster” and “Swampbuster” respectively, aimed 
to reduce soil erosion and sedimentation of surface waters, improve water quality, and 
protect wetlands. (USDA, 2006a; USDAa, publication date unknown) 
CRP has been recognized as one of the first long-term land retirement incentive program 
with overt conservation objectives. Until 1985, various programs were used to encourage 
producers to divert land from production to control crop yields and prices (Johnson and 
Clark, publication date unknown). CRP, however, had a dual role. Its explicit goal was to 
protect natural resources, and it did so while also serving as a supply management tool 
(Johnson and Clark, publication date unknown; Claassen and Morehart, 2006). Its 
conservation objectives—considerably broader than the sole historic focus on soil 
conservation—were to safeguard environmentally sensitive lands from production to 
control soil erosion, improve water and air quality, and enhance wildlife habitat (USDAb, 
publication date unknown).  
Alongside these measures to tie conservation objectives to farm-income support, the 1985 
Farm Bill also included a program specifically designed to emphasize measurable 
environmental performance and locally-relevant conservation objectives. A land-
retirement program providing payments above those provided by CRP, the Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) was targeted to key geographic areas where 
organizational partnerships between NRCS, the State, and other stakeholders interested in 
addressing particular environmental issues existed. CREP partnerships were required to 
establish measurable objectives and conduct annual monitoring to measure progress 
toward implementation of those objectives. (USDAb, publication date unknown) 
 
Background   8
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990:  
Addressing Disincentives to Stewardship and Unequal Payments for Good 
Stewards  
In spite of the critical measures passed in 1985, legitimate concerns continued about the 
environmental impacts of farm subsidies. The concept of decoupling—separating the 
level of income support from the amount of acres a farmer kept in production of 
commodity crops—shaped the discussions leading up to the 1990 Farm Bill (Helms, 
2003). Conservation was not the only rationale suggested for decoupling; the issue of 
equity also arose. During the Farm Bill debates, Senators complained that farmers who 
used management practices like crop rotations and cover crops received less income 
support, due to lower production, than those who did not let good stewardship practices 
interfere with their production goals (Helms, 2003). 
The 1990 Farm Bill (the Food Agriculture and Trade Act) loosened requirements for 
commodity production, allowing farmers to devote a percentage of their acres to other 
crops while maintaining subsidy payments based on historic commodity production 
levels (Helms, 2003). This was expected to reduce the effect of income support on 
production decisions (Claassen and Morehart, 2006) and encourage farmers to use more 
crop rotations and cover crops (Helms, 2003). This was a small, but important step, 
toward reducing disincentives to good stewardship and addressing a system-wide 
inequity. Nonetheless, such inequities and disincentives persist—as the perspectives 
gathered in this study show—and remain the subject of debate today. 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996:  
Advancing Green Payments, Working Lands Stewardship, and Targeting 
The most remarkable aspect of the 1996 Farm Bill (the Federal Agriculture Improvement 
and Reform Act) was the vigor of green payments discourse that preceded it. Many 
conservation advocates favored merging the concepts of decoupling and stewardship 
payments by substituting a green payments system for the current income support system. 
Between 1994 and 1996, numerous agricultural economists, government policy analysts, 
and conservation advocacy groups—including American Farmland Trust, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Soil and Water 
Conservation Society, Environmental Working Group (Batie, 2007), among others—
published proposals for green payment programs. (Helms, 2003) 
At the same time, the recently signed General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—which 
launched the World Trade Organization (WTO)—appeared to spell an eventual end to the 
subsidy system due to its market distorting effects. Some saw green payments as a means 
to ensure farmer income support under increasing trade restrictions. (Helms, 2003) 
Expanding on the equity issue highlighted in the 1990 debates and foreshadowing a 
theme that shaped the 2002 Farm Bill, the agricultural community began to call attention 
to the need to support conservation efforts on working land and to reward good stewards. 
It was charged that farmers who practiced good stewardship were often shut out of the 
farm spending system, which mainly split its dollars between production-driven subsidies 
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and land retirement payments, with a few minor conservation programs making payments 
to farmers willing to implement new conservation practices. Gary Mast, a representative 
of the National Association of Conservation Districts, stated in a Congressional hearing, 
“Many agricultural producers feel that existing conservation programs are flawed: They 
reward primarily those farmers who have not managed their land well. Few programs 
offer incentives or rewards to landowners who have avoided natural resource programs 
by practicing good stewardship.” (Helms, 2003) 
A final, but important, idea—the concept of targeting spending—was quietly raised 
which aimed to improve the environmental performance of conservation spending. 
Though many scientists and agricultural economists tout the cost- and environmental-
effectiveness of targeting conservation programs to distinct geographic areas or resource 
concerns, such proposals tend to be politically difficult because of the beneficiaries who 
are left out.  Without using the term “targeting,” however, the USDA’s Farm Bill 
proposal advocated focusing land retirement and cost-sharing programs “on clearly 
defined natural resources programs.” (Helms, 2003) 
The resulting Farm Bill enacted both strong targeting measures and a conservation 
program that has become the key vehicle for working lands conservation incentives. The 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) was launched to provide cost-share 
payments to farmers for installing structural improvements or implementing management 
practices that would reduce environmental degradation. EQIP funds would be available 
for best management practices addressing a range of environmental issues, including 
nutrient management, integrated pest management, irrigation water management, and 
wildlife habitat management (Johansson, 2006). 
Two provisions were enacted to more effectively target conservation investments. First, 
50% of EQIP funds were targeted for livestock operations—farms with conservation 
needs that had not been addressed by most prior conservation programs and that were 
beginning to be subject to Clean Water Act regulations (Batie, 2007)—and producer 
applications would be ranked according to the expected environmental benefit per dollar 
of program expenditure (Claassen et al., 2001). Second, the Farm Bill authorized the 
Secretary of Agriculture to designate conservation priority areas—“watersheds, multi-
state areas, or regions of special environmental sensitivity”—for a substantial share of 
EQIP and other conservation program investments (SWCS/ED, 2007a).  
Interestingly, one historian reports that the 1996 bill also included the first, but 
unfortunately unfunded and unimplemented, initiative designed to make annual payments 
to good stewards—farmers who managed their operations according to a “whole farm 
conservation plan” instead of simply implementing ad-hoc efforts eligible for EQIP or 
land retirement program payments. The Conservation Farm Option, as it was called, was 
the precursor to the Conservation Security Program passed six years later in the 2002 
Farm Bill. (Helms, 2003) 
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The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002:  
Winning Working Lands and Green Payments Progress, Losing Targeting 
By all accounts, the 2002 Farm Bill (the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act) has 
been recognized for giving unprecedented priority to working lands programs and for 
establishing the Conservation Security Program (CSP), a major statutory victory for 
green payments advocates. And the debate the shaped the bill was persistent and lively. 
In 2001, two important publications insisted that conservation investments needed to 
focus on land in production, especially to address critical nutrient management problems 
which were the target of increasing federal and state regulatory pressure. In January, a 
team of agricultural economists with the USDA Economic Research Service published 
Agri-Environmental Policy at a Crossroads: Guideposts for a Changing Landscape 
(Claassen et al., 2001). This paper asserted, “Since the mid-1980’s, land retirement has 
dominated Federal spending on [conservation] programs…[These] policies cannot 
address environmental damages from the vast majority of cropland that remains in 
production…, namely nutrient loss to surface and ground water.” Simultaneously, the 
USDA issued a vision statement, Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New 
Century (USDA 2001). Explaining that 92 percent of all farm conservation spending 
since 1985 had been spent on land retirement, the USDA argued that working lands 
investments were essential for reducing nutrient runoff from fertilizer and animal waste. 
Simultaneously, a new green payments program began to take shape in the discussions 
among the USDA, economists, and conservation advocates—a program that would 
reward good stewards, provide payments in proportion to environmental performance, 
and model a different kind of farm-income support than the subsidy system. It would be 
based on paying for the environmental services, rather than the commodities, supplied by 
farmers. Taking Stock for the New Century (USDA 2001) described a new approach that 
could compensate farmers for the environmental amenities they provide and recognize 
the past efforts of “good actors” who already practice high levels of stewardship.  
An initiative that would begin to advance a new kind of farmer income support, tied 
directly to conservation, was supported widely for several reasons. Sustainable 
agriculture, family-farm, and environmental organizations saw an opportunity to make 
the farm-income support system more equitable for small and sustainable farms, to 
expand incentives for conservation, and to create an alternative to the pesticide- and 
fertilizer-promoting commodity subsidies (Lichtenberg, 2004). Though they vehemently 
opposed substituting conservation payments for commodity subsidies, commodity 
growers’ associations supported a voluntary, incentive-based conservation subsidy that 
could help producers cover costs and risks associated with meeting increasing federal and 
state regulations (Helms, 2003). Additional support for conservation subsidies came from 
continuing WTO restrictions on trade-distorting commodity production subsidies 
(Lichtenberg, 2004; Helms, 2003). 
The results of these efforts were the establishment of CSP, and between funding for it and 
an enormous expansion of funding for EQIP, a six-fold increase in funding for working 
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lands programs (Lichtenberg, 2004). These two major changes brought opportunities and 
challenges that are still being worked out to this day, and which are explored in this study.  
One other, much less publicized, but significant component of the 2002 Farm Bill was the 
elimination of the targeting provisions advanced six years before. Conservation priority 
areas—watersheds and regions of special environmental concern—had been used by the 
USDA to focus the majority (73%) of EQIP spending between 1997 and 2002, and this 
caused frustration for producers outside those priority areas (SWCS/ED, 2007a; 
Johansson, 2006). As a result of the 2002 Farm Bill, national environmental priorities—
reducing non-point source pollution, soil erosion, and habitat loss—replaced 
geographically-defined priority areas as a means to screen producers’ EQIP applications 
(Johansson, 2006). The bill did, however, contain provisions to allow the USDA to 
dedicate a portion of program funding to local or regional partnerships, and to provide 
higher CSP payments to farmers participating in regional or watershed-based efforts (P.L. 
107-171). Unfortunately, the USDA chose not to implement either provision (SAC, 2006; 
SWCS/ED, 2007a). 
Summary of Key Themes and Federal Working Lands Programs 
The major increase in resources for conservation on working land delivered by the 2002 
Farm Bill signifies a change in perception about agriculture and the environment. The 
historic emphasis of conservation programs on retiring land from agriculture was based 
on an assumption that agricultural production is inherently harmful to natural resources. 
“In most of the United States,” where, as the Director of the Soil and Water Conservation 
Society argues, “agriculture is the environment” as well as the leading cause of hypoxia 
in the Gulf of Mexico and the largest source of impaired rivers and streams (Cox, 2007), 
treating productive land as a sacrifice zone is terribly pessimistic. Fortunately, the new 
emphasis on working lands—now constituting half of all USDA conservation 
expenditures (USDA, 2006a)—“ promotes agricultural production and environmental 
quality as compatible national goals” (USDA NRCS, 2007). It responds to the optimism 
of consumers, environmentalists, and farmers who have rallied for the possibility of 
sustainable production systems.  
While shifting the priorities and affording new opportunities for agency implementers, 
the emergence of working lands programs also creates significant challenges. For 
example, it takes a different type and intensity of technical assistance to help farmers 
change their production practices (this is even more true if those changes are to be 
effective, monitored, and measured) than to simply offer monetary contracts for land 
retirement (Heimlich in Lynch and Batie, 2006). To deliver more robust technical 
assistance and track program progress, new analytical tools are needed. As conservation 
staff work with farmers to evaluate their operations for potential changes, it is inevitable 
that the influence of production subsidies on management practices will be more 
recognized as an impediment to conservation-oriented farm system. Program designers 
will be forced to consider the form incentives must take to stimulate desired changes. All 
of these changes will demand new knowledge, resources, and organizational 
infrastructure to succeed. 
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Since this study explores perceptions of the efficacy of working lands conservation 
incentives, it is important to briefly review the key programs and the critiques that 
surround them. The portfolio of USDA working lands conservation tools includes the 
conservation compliance provisions for farm income support, EQIP, CSP, and a variety 
of funding streams to support technical assistance services. 
Conservation Compliance 
Currently, conservation compliance provisions require farmers who receive income 
support, such as subsidies or loans, to submit a farm conservation plan with NRCS which 
demonstrates the use of conservation practices on highly erodible land that has been in 
crop production since 1985 and certifies that highly erodible land and wetlands not in 
crop production before 1985 have not been converted to crop production (USDAa, 
publication date unknown). While extremely important for establishing minimum 
conservation expectations, compliance provisions are limited to commodity-producing 
operations and do not encourage higher levels of stewardship. 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
As the dominant working lands program, EQIP is widely sought after by farmers. The 
program primarily provides cost-sharing (up to 75% of the cost) to farmers for 
implementing new conservation structures, such as manure storage facilities, sediment 
and nutrient filter strips, or grassed waterways (USDA NRCS, 2007). EQIP also provides 
incentive payments through several year contracts to help with the cost of management-
intensive conservation practices, such as nutrient or pest management practices (USDA 
NRCS, 2007). These types of payments are much less common than cost-share 
payments—they constituted only 18% of all EQIP expenditures in 2005—and 
consequently, the program has been criticized for a bias towards ad-hoc conservation 
measures rather than whole system conservation planning (SWCS/ED, 2007a). It is not 
evident why this bias exists, but since it results from USDA operations, not any statutory 
limitation, limited technical assistance resources or the conservation preferences of 
farmers are likely culprits. Another possibility is that as a short-term incentive, EQIP is 
simply better suited to assist with the one-time costs of structural improvements.  
EQIP has also been criticized by farmers who already have established records of good 
conservation practice for supporting “bad actors”—for providing payments to farmers 
who otherwise would not practice good stewardship rather than to those who already do. 
And, since the 2002 elimination of targeting provisions, conservation organizations 
complain that spending has become diffuse, preventing a “critical mass” of investments 
in any one area capable of producing meaningful environmental improvements 
(SWCS/ED, 2007a). Nonetheless, efforts to promote targeting continue to be promoted in 
the mission statements and Farm Bill objectives of the USDA (NRCS USDA, publication 
date unknown, USDA 2006, USDA 2007). 
 
Background   13
Technical Assistance 
Funding for technical assistance (for example, the human resources that deliver USDA 
conservation programs and assist farmers with management planning) comes from many 
sources. Some technical assistance (TA) funds are included within the budgets of 
particular programs, and other funds are provided through discrete Farm Bill line items. 
Resources for technical assistance—for knowledgeable field and technical staff—are 
essential to high quality program delivery, and the pressures for abundant and talented 
staff will increase with the move toward working lands, performance-based, and 
management-intensive conservation initiatives (Heimlich in Lynch and Batie, 2006; Cox, 
2007). 
Conservation Security Program (CSP) 
With many new features at both the statutory and program design levels, CSP is very 
much a work in progress, and as such, perceptions of its significance vary widely. On the 
one hand, CSP has been recognized as innovative on several levels. Promoted with the 
slogan “Reward the best and motivate the rest,” CSP is the first program that makes 
payments not only for new conservation commitments, but also for existing practices 
(Helms, 2003; Johansson, 2006; SWSC/ED, 2007b). In fact, existing performance in 
attaining soil and water conservation objectives on at least part of the farm is a 
prerequisite for program eligibility (Johansson, 2006).  
With vigorous interest in whole-farm management by advocates of CSP and statutory 
language allowing the USDA to assist CSP producers “in developing a comprehensive, 
long-term strategy for improving and maintaining all natural resources of the agricultural 
operation” (P.L. 107-171), CSP has been perceived as basing rewards on the “benefits of 
the total package [of farm management] rather than on individual practices” (Helm, 
2003). And unlike EQIP, CSP theoretically scales much of its payments to the estimated 
environmental gains from the whole package of management practices on a particular 
farm, as measured by environmental indices (Johansson, 2006; USDA, 2006a; Weinberg 
and Claassen, 2006). 
On the other hand, as implemented, CSP contrasts with these expectations and has been 
the target of much criticism. First of all, because the statute covered a broad diversity of 
agricultural operations and conservation objectives, targeted existing stewardship 
practices, and prohibited the use of a competitive application process, it was written as an 
entitlement program (P.L. 107-171, Johnson, 2004b). The budget provided to implement 
CSP was severely limited, however (Johnson, 2004a), and as a result, the USDA was 
forced to design the program in such a way as to reduce its availability. Enrollment 
categories and tiers were designed to select applicants, and a watershed rotation system 
was instituted which would offer the program to an affordable number of watersheds 
each year until all U.S. farmers had a chance to apply (Johnson, 2004a; Johansson, 2006). 
These two changes, alone, created a complex and confusing program unable to have a 
continuous presence in any region. With such constraints, the ability for CSP to stimulate 
new stewardship commitments—“motivate the rest”—may have been severely 
compromised.  
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In addition, to underscore the income-support aspect of the program (Batie, 2007), 
Congress capped the percentage of resources available for funding technical assistance 
(as opposed to the resources available for farmer payments) at 15 percent (P.L. 107-171). 
Such a meager investment in TA conflicted with the increasing time and expertise 
demanded by a performance-based, whole-farm conservation program (Heimlich, 2006). 
Consequently, the program has been disparaged for being confusing (Heimlich, 2006), 
“practice-based” rather than “performance-based” (Heimlich, 2006), over-emphasizing 
soil conservation objectives (a consequence of limited analytical tools—only indices for 
estimating environmental gains of soil condition have been thoroughly developed and 
implemented) (Lundgren et al., 2006, SAC, 2005; Heller, 2005; Heimlich, 2006), and for 
paying for “status quo” levels of stewardship that would have occurred anyway 
(SWCS/ED, 2007b). Small and sustainable farm advocacy organizations have 
additionally criticized CSP for a bias against small and organic operations and a failure to 
reward extremely thorough conservation practices like management intensive rotational 
grazing (SAC, 2004; Lundgren, 2006). While many have pointed out that the CSP was 
intentionally broad to appeal to a wide range of constituents and to support the dual goals 
of income-support and conservation (Helms, 2003), others have expressed that “there is 
nothing worse than implementing a broad program that addresses all objectives poorly” 
(Batie, 2006) and “CSP is falling short of realizing” any of its goals (Cox, 2006).  
CSP is still a new program, and its identity is still emerging. Nonetheless, the objectives 
that shaped CSP—to provide incentives for stewardship, to begin to create an alternative 
to the environmental and market distorting commodity programs, and to achieve robust 
and measurable environmental outcomes—are important for the long term potential of 
the full suite of working lands conservation programs. The interviews in the Schuylkill 
attempt to ascertain the degree to which these priorities can be felt by stakeholders far 
down the implementation chain, the consistency between these objectives and local 
priorities for conservation programs, and the challenges to realizing their full potential.  
THE SCHUYLKILL RIVER WATERSHED 
About 80 miles long and draining to the Delaware River in Philadelphia, the Schuylkill 
River’s watershed is located in southeastern Pennsylvania and includes the majority of 
Schuylkill, Berks, Montgomery, and Philadelphia Counties as well as portions of seven 
other counties. The watershed covers a diverse land area, from the Appalachian 
Mountains in the west through fertile farmland into highly urbanized Philadelphia. (The 
Conservation Fund, 2001) 
In spite of increasing competition from sprawling residential development, over a third of 
the watershed is currently in agricultural land use, most of which is in Berks County 
(PWD, 2002). At the center of the watershed, Berks County compromises 40 percent of 
the watershed and is almost completely within the watershed boundaries, suggesting that 
the County’s land use has a significant impact on the condition of the Schuylkill and its 
tributaries (The Conservation Fund, 2001). Additionally, almost 40 percent of the land in 
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Berks County is productive farmland (NASS, 2004). Figure 2 shows the percent of 
land use in the watershed that is agricultural. 
This region has a long history of farming and today supports a diverse mix of livestock 
and crops and a relatively large number of small and medium sized farms. For example, 
in 2002, the average farm size in Berks County was 120 acres, with the vast majority 
being less than 500 acres and over half under 50 acres (NASS, 2004). About 20% of them 
grow row crops exclusively, a small percentage grow fruit and vegetables, and the rest 
support livestock or grow pasture and hay (PWD, 2002; NASS, 2004).  
Figure 1 – Schuylkill River Watershed (The Conservation Fund, 2001) 
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Figure 2 – Agricultural Land Cover (The Conservation Fund, 2001)
Resource Concerns and 
Conservation Priorities in 
the Watershed 
It is nearly impossible to 
consider key conservation 
issues in a watershed, without 
the geographic target itself—
the fact that it is a watershed 
and not a political or other 
natural resource territory—
leading to a consideration of 
water resources. The fact that 
about 1.8 million people 
residing in the Philadelphia 
Region depend on the 
Schuylkill River as their 
drinking source (PWD, 2002) 
makes water quality issues 
especially important. The 
Schuylkill River Watershed as 
a jurisdiction is well-
recognized and water quality is 
a source of considerable attention and concern by environmental organizations and local 
residents.  
As a consequence of the high visibility of the Schuylkill, there are literally dozens of 
conservation efforts focusing on the Watershed and its tributaries. Led by government 
agencies, watershed organizations, educational institutions, and citizens groups, efforts 
include water quality reports, monitoring programs, conservation plans, riparian 
restoration, dam removal, and environmental education efforts. Most focus on water 
resource objectives, but a few focus on land conservation—especially connected 
greenways—for recreation, historic preservation, and wildlife habitat (PWD, 2002; The 
Conservation Fund, 2001). Of the numerous efforts, the two planning processes and 
coalition conservation effort described below appear to be most influential with regard to 
issues stemming from agriculture. 
In 2002, the Philadelphia Water Department (PWD) conducted a study to assess the water 
quality in the Schuylkill River watershed. The Source Water Assessment Report 
attributed water quality impairments in the Schuylkill to four major factors: urban 
stormwater runoff, agricultural practices, abandoned mine drainage, and sewage 
overflows. Agricultural runoff was ranked as the second leading cause of pollution after 
impacts from urban runoff. As a significant source of sediment, phosphorous, and 
nitrogen pollution, as well as bacterial pathogens, farming practices degrade drinking 
water quality and aquatic habitat. (PWD, 2002)  
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Figure 5 – Nitrogen from Land Cover 
(The Conservation Fund, 2001) 
Figure 3 – Phosphorous from Land Cover Figure 4 – Sediment from Land Cover 
Using Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection impaired 
stream data (the EPA 303(d) listing), the 
study estimated that nearly 30% of 
impaired stream miles resulted from 
agriculture, and that 200 of the 258 
agriculturally impaired stream miles are 
located in Berks County. The report 
further noted that though the amount of 
agricultural land is decreasing due to 
residential development, the impacts of 
agricultural activity are not likely to 
increase as production is concentrated 
into smaller areas. Figures 3-53 show 
stream load levels for the three most 
significant sources of agriculturally-
driven water pollution. (PWD 2002) 
Around the same time, the Conservation 
Fund gathered a committee of scientists, 
public officials, policy experts, and citizens to create the Schuylkill River Watershed 
Conservation Plan (The Conservation Fund, 2001) for the Pennsylvania Department of 
Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR). In conjunction with a sister project called 
the State of the Schuylkill River Watershed (The Conservation Fund et al., 2002), this 
                                                 
3 The maps are labeled as found (produced originally by the Patrick Center at the Academy of Natural 
Sciences), but the nitrogen map appears to be mixed up with one of the other two as the phosphorous and 
sediment patterns should be roughly parallel. Attempts to communicate with the author were unsuccessful. 
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effort compiled data on baseline water quality conditions from numerous sources, sought 
substantial public input, and made recommendations.  
The process of creating these documents brought together a wide variety of stakeholders, 
some of whom had rarely worked together, as one participant interviewed for this study 
observed. Recognizing the significance of this collaboration, local stakeholders partnered 
with the EPA to launch the coalition, the Schuylkill Action Network (SAN). With a 
mission to restore and protect the regional drinking water supply (SAN, 2006) SAN 
institutionalized cooperation in the Schuylkill. Participating agencies were divided into 
working groups by pollution source, and the Agricultural Working Group represents 
several dozen staff from conservation organizations and agricultural assistance and water 
quality regulatory agencies (SAN website). Participants in the process have been 
enthusiastic about the resulting improved relations—traditionally fraught with distrust—
between the water quality advocacy and regulation community and agricultural advocacy 
and assistance organizations. 
The objectives of SAN and the two major planning efforts are consistent with one another: 
to control the entry of sediment and nutrients from farms to the Schuylkill River and its 
tributaries (SAN, 2006; PWD, 2002; The Conservation Fund, 2001). All three efforts also 
recommend common strategies: 
1. To develop and implement nutrient management plans to reduce nutrient loading 
from excess fertilizer and animal waste 
2. To implement erosion control practices to control sediment loading 
3. To protect (fencing out livestock) and restore riparian buffers to address problems 
of sediment, nutrient, and pathogen pollution. 
The high level of consistency of goals and recommendations across these efforts 
demonstrates strong consensus with regards to water quality objectives for the region. It 
is interesting to note that the Source Water Protection Assessment specifically calls on 
the USDA to target funding of its conservation programs for water quality protection and 
to consult water suppliers to identify critical geographic targets for improving water 
quality.  
Farm Bill Conservation Activity in the Watershed 
Farm Bill conservation programs are primarily implemented by the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) through its county offices. In southeastern Pennsylvania, 
however, NRCS also contracts with the county Conservation Districts to deliver elements 
of Farm Bill conservation programs Conservation District staff work closely not only 
with NRCS, but also with state agencies who they assist in implementing nutrient 
management and erosion control policies. Consequently, Conservation District staff have 
significant contact with many of the same farmers as NRCS. 
In 2005, the full suite of Farm Bill conservation programs was available in the counties of 
the Schuylkill River Watershed, including CREP, which is only available for targeted 
regions and partnerships, and CSP, which is only available to a portion of the nation’s 
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watersheds each year. In 2005, the Schuylkill was one of 202 watersheds selected 
nationally to participate in CSP.  
Data on the funding of working lands programs in the Schuylkill is difficult to access. 
However, data is available on implementation of CSP. The NRCS District Manager in 
conjunction with the Berks County NRCS office delivered CSP in the Schuylkill. A total 
of 86 CSP contracts were awarded in the watershed with total fiscal year payments of 
$307,362 (which only represents a portion of committed funds since contracts are 5-10 
years in length) (SAC, 2006a). Those 86 contracts were awarded to 2.6% of all farms in 
the watershed and covered 12,745 acres, or 3.6% of the total agricultural acreage in the 
watershed (SAC, 2006a). The average size of the farms receiving CSP contracts in the 
Schuylkill is 148 acres, a bit larger than the overall average farm size of 120 acres for 
Berks County (NASS, 2004). (NRCS 2006) 
INTERVIEW PROCESS & PARTICIPANTS 
The primary objective of the interviews was to understand which characteristics of 
conservation programs constituted effective conservation incentives as perceived by local 
stakeholders. In addition, I sought to discover how recent and emerging federal policy 
changes—to increase program performance, reform the farmer income-support system, 
and reward stewardship—carried through the implementation system and either increased 
or decreased the perceived effectiveness of conservation incentives. To do this, I sought 
observations on what worked best in the full suite of working lands programs, what the 
gaps were, and whether and how new reforms—especially those embodied in the national 
green payments discussion, CSP, and targeting and partnership measures aimed to 
produce regionally meaningful environmental outcomes—added value. I also sought 
information on how closely federal conservation priorities and strategies matched local 
conservation challenges and objectives. 
I chose to interview local stakeholders who experience the major working lands 
conservation programs as close to the final stage of implementation as possible. These 
stakeholders include farmers and program implementers, both NRCS and others 
responsible for delivering conservation programs on working lands. By interviewing a 
range of local stakeholders, I believed I would be able to obtain a more complete and 
three-dimensional picture of patterns, opportunities, and challenges that should be 
considered as working lands conservation programs continue to evolve. The observations 
of farmers, field staff, and other community-level agency implementers provide critical 
information on the functional effectiveness of conservation programs, yet their voices are 
frequently absent from federal policy discussions.  
Three sets of interview questions were developed: one for farmers, one for NRCS 
program implementers, and one for non-NRCS program implementers (see the 
appendices). Each set of questions covers four major topics: 
• Perceptions of the most important local resource concerns 
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• Perceptions of the best practices for addressing those issues and barriers to such 
practices 
• Perceptions of the effectiveness of the full range of available conservation programs 
in promoting the best practices and addressing priority resource concerns 
• Perceptions of the value of emerging (green payments) program strategies such as 
stewardship payments, emphasis on management rather than structural conservation 
practices, and others aimed at increasing conservation performance 
Within each topic, many questions were used to prompt participants and gain more 
detailed insights into particular characteristics of successful and flawed programs, other 
needed tools for promoting conservation, and their particular experiences. Each interview 
followed a unique trajectory, with slightly different questions, but the main themes were 
covered as completely and consistently as possible with each participant. 
To protect the confidentiality of participants, all feedback is provided anonymously in 
this report. A brief description of the interview participants follows. 
The Farmers 
Seven farmers were interviewed for this study. Six of those farmers received CSP 
contracts (out of 86 recipients total). Contact information was provided for those six by 
the NRCS district office4 in response to a request for farmers who represent the range of 
farm sizes and types and who had experience with CSP as well as other programs. I 
specifically included experience with CSP in my request so I could hear how farmers 
perceived the comparative value of ongoing versus emerging program strategies. By 
prioritizing CSP participants in my interview pool, I was also able to glean information 
about the type of farmers identified by NRCS as good stewards. The seventh farmer 
interviewed was based on a referral from one of the other participating farmers and had 
participated in several NRCS programs, but not CSP. All farmers interviewed were 
located in Berks County. The following provides summary information on the farmers’ 
operations and conservation experience. 
Mid-sized dairy: One interviewee runs a dairy farm full-time with two brothers, none of 
whom earn income off the farm. The farm has about 120 milking age cows and an equal 
number of younger cows. They own 640 tillable acres (which is larger than 95% of farms 
in Berks County), all of which are in production except 120 acres which they bought 
while under a CREP land retirement contract. They plan on putting the CREP land into 
production as soon as the contract expires. About 80-100 acres is planted in alfalfa and 
grass hay. The rest is rotated between corn, soybeans, and wheat, which are fed to their 
own herds unless there is a surplus to sell. They reported receiving about $9000 per year 
                                                 
4 This selection method may be inherently biased toward farmers NRCS staff believed likely to speak 
positively about their experience. Likewise, the fact that NRCS staff knew the identities of farmer 
interviewees may have also made them reluctant to share negative experiences. These potential biases were 
unavoidable since lists of CSP participants are not publicly available. Nonetheless, respondents seemed 
quite candid and comfortable expressing criticism.  
 
Background   21
in commodity payments and a varying level of loan deficiency payments (LDP)—
$16,000 in 2005, a high paying year. They practice no-till, other soil conservation 
practices, and have a manure storage facility. They have participated in EQIP and CSP. 
They received a $20,500 CSP contract with an almost $7000 first year payment (around 
twice the average size for the Schuylkill (SAC, 2006a)), most of which was for soil 
conservation. 
Small dairy: Another interviewee runs a dairy farm full-time with 55 cows. The farmer 
owns 113 acres, 80 of which is in production, and rents 145 additional acres from 
neighbors, on which alfalfa, corn, and grass hay is grown for the cows. Typically, there is 
not a surplus crop. Previously, the farm had almost double the acreage and number of 
cows; the operation has shrunk due to loss of rental property to CREP and residential 
development. The farmer reported receiving about $20,000 in commodity and loan 
deficiency payments in 2005, which was slightly higher than other years. The farm is a 
no-till operation. CSP is the first NRCS program the interviewee ever participated in. The 
CSP contract was over $12,000 with a slightly larger than average first year payment  for 
the watershed (SAC, 2006a), most of which was for soil conservation. 
Poultry farm: A third farmer primarily grows chickens for a corporate poultry 
manufacturer in two broiler houses that shelter 5600 chickens at a time (seven flocks per 
year), boards 28 replacement cows for a nearby dairy, and grows feed for the cows and a 
bit of surplus cash crop. 340 acres, including 160 rental acres, grow corn, soybeans, a 
little wheat, and some hay. This farmer is relatively new to the industry, farming for only 
10 years, but doing it full-time. The farm receives about $3000 in commodity payments 
each year, and varying LDP payments (sometimes nothing). In 2005, LDP payments 
were between around $7500, an unusually high payment. This farmer sold the 
development rights to protect the land as permanent farmland, practices no-till, maintains 
a manure storage facility, and has participated in EQIP for stream fencing and manure 
storage, CREP for riparian areas, and CSP. This farm’s CSP award was $15,000 and 
primarily for soil conservation. 
Orchard: This farmer operates an orchard and several adjunct businesses—an orchard 
supply business, a direct-to-consumer retail outlet, and produces a line of peach wine. 
Four siblings are involved in the farm to varying degrees. On the majority of 117 acres 
they own and 60 acres they rent, they grow peaches, apples, pears, plums, nectarines, and 
pumpkins. Most of their produce is sold wholesale with a smaller volume going to the 
retail outlet. The siblings are working to diversify the operation. One received a grant to 
investigate the feasibility of agritourism, perhaps on-farm educational tours, a u-pick 
operation, or a bed and breakfast, and they all are trying to find a means for long term 
profitability. Over the years, they have sold a few acres and rented out a few buildings on 
the property to supplement the farm income. Fruit growers do not receive commodity 
payments, but in drought years, they may receive natural disaster payments. They 
implement integrated pest management (IPM) practices and have participated in state 
IPM research activities. They enrolled in CSP, receiving over $17,500, mostly for IPM. 
Christmas tree farm/managed habitat: A Christmas tree farm on ten acres of a 120-
acre property is managed by its young landowner. Grown among tall, warm season 
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grasses and shrubs, the tree plantation is one part of a patchwork of woods, natural 
wetlands, former croplands planted into prairie species, small streams, and constructed 
ponds, all of which lie adjacent to a large public forest. Various long term income-
generating strategies, such as establishing a hunting refuge, that do not conflict with 
restoration goals are being pursued. The landowner has participated in habitat restoration 
programs with the State and non-profit organizations, as well as the NRCS programs, 
EQIP, WHIP (Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program), and CSP. The CSP contract applied 
only to the tree plantation acreage (the productive land), was less than $1500, about one-
seventh the average Schuylkill payment (SAC, 2006a), and provided more benefits for 
energy conservation (recycling motor oil) than for the habitat value of the management 
practices. 
Horse farm: This landowner operates a small horse farm that boards 15 horses, breeds, 
and teaches riding lessons. The farmer obtains the majority of income from breeding. 25 
acres are used for a riding ring and six paddocks. Six acres, plus 20 rental acres, are used 
to grow hay for feed. CSP is the first NRCS program in which this farm has participated. 
The award was less than $1800 and provided the greatest benefits for energy 
conservation (motor oil recycling). Over half the farm’s acres were excluded from the 
contract because NRCS determined that breeding activities were insufficient to qualify 
the whole farm as working land. 
Small sheep/goat farm: This last farm, a sheep and goat farm based on a 44-acre 
property and three additional rental properties, is arranged as a rotational grazing 
operation. The 40-50 ewes and 20-25 goats move between paddocks on all four 
properties and the farmer grows hay exclusively. The farmer has been trying to find a 
way through regulations to establish an on-site butchery. This operation is downsized 
from a prior farm with pigs, cattle, hay, and corn. The farmer did not apply to participate 
in CSP based on the belief that this new farm did not have established enough 
conservation practices to qualify, but has participated in EQIP. 
The Program Implementers 
All program implementers interviewed were identified through conversations with NRCS 
staff and local conservation leaders. They are all individuals deeply involved in 
agricultural conservation program delivery in the Schuylkill River Watershed. Four 
NRCS employees were interviewed: two were involved with CSP implementation in the 
Schuylkill, one was engaged with SAN’s Agricultural Working Group, and one had 
federal CSP experience. All had broad experience with the full suite of NRCS programs. 
Non-NRCS interview participants included three county Conservation District employees 
(from three different counties), one manager and two field staff; and four water quality 
conservation program managers working on agricultural non-point source pollution, two 
staff of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, one staff member of 
the EPA, and a director of a local conservation non-profit. Most of these interviewees 
were familiar or involved with SAN’s Agricultural Working Group, and all had 
experience partnering, some more closely than others, with NRCS.  
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3. Findings and Discussion 
 
I think more and more we are going to have to look to farmers to be our 
conservationists because pretty soon, with ongoing suburban sprawl, farms are going 
to be all we have left. We are going to need farmers to provide habitat for wildlife 
and protect our water. 
— comment from a county Conservation District employee 
 
Farmers are in complete and utter denial about the pollution occurring in their 
watersheds. The view is that farming is a natural process. 
— comment from a water quality program implementer 
 
Like the above quotes, working lands conservation programs cut both ways. They are 
based on the premise that working farmland must not be an environmental sacrifice zone, 
that farmers can be an integral part of achieving conservation objectives. They have also 
been advanced as a means to address the serious problems caused by some production 
practices. 
The farmers in this study were supportive of conservation programs focused on 
productive lands and often equally resentful of anything, such as CREP, that drove land 
out of production. CREP, the best funded land retirement program in the watershed, was 
identified by every farmer who grew cash crops or livestock feed as a barrier to 
profitability. Several had lost productive rental acres to the program, and one awaited the 
end of a CREP contract to put purchased land into production. One of the farmers 
described the situation this way: “Owners are putting land into CREP instead of renting it 
for production. Renters can’t compete with $150/acre.” This concern was especially 
aggravated by the similar impacts of sprawling suburban development and the increasing 
value of grain crops in the wake of a growing ethanol industry. In contrast, these 
producers felt that working lands programs, like EQIP and CSP, were pro-farmer. 
On the other hand, several farmers and agency implementers expressed concerns about an 
artificial divide between working lands and land retirement incentives. The horse farmer 
had to prove to NRCS that the farm was, in fact, a working farm by demonstrating that 
the majority of the operation’s income came from breeding. Another farmer reported that 
a nursery manager he knew was denied eligibility for CSP because nurseries do not count 
as working lands. In both cases, the land uses have potential for contributing to or 
preventing sediment and nutrient pollution similar to any livestock or produce operation.  
The Christmas tree farmer believed it important to focus equally on the productive and 
fallow areas of the farm. Implementers agreed. Some felt there were not sufficient 
program tools available to fence off and restore the buffering capacity of riparian areas, a 
function straddling land retirement and working lands programs. Others pointed out the 
importance of CREP for removing riparian areas from production, and did not want to 
see this strategic use of CREP diminished.  
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These interviewees wanted to see a seamless one-stop-shop system where farmers could 
get strategic conservation planning assistance for their particular operation and apply for 
appropriate programs, whether in the land retirement or working lands category. The 
desire for comprehensive, strategic planning assistance by both farmers and agency staff 
is a theme that pervades these interviews.  
This section of the report summarizes the findings from interviews about what works and 
what does not in the current system of conservation incentives. It is organized into four 
parts. The first two summarize what interviewees revealed about what may be needed for 
programs to maximize environmental outcomes, first, at the farm scale, and second, at the 
regional scale. The third part provides an overview of interviewee perceptions of how 
program performance is and can be evaluated. Finally, the last part covers the problems 
and values interviewees ascribed to stewardship payments. 
MAXIMIZING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AT THE FARM-SCALE 
There are two scales at which the effectiveness of conservation programs can be 
evaluated – that of the farm operation and that of the broader landscape or region. High 
performance at the farm-scale occurs when programs and incentives match the resource 
concerns where the most progress can be made and encourage the most environmentally- 
and cost-effective practices for addressing those concerns. When asked about what makes 
conservation programs effective, both farmers and implementers shared the following 
strong opinions. 
• Programs, and the practices they encourage, should be tied to local conservation 
objectives and adapted to local agronomic and economic conditions. 
• The effectiveness of conservation programming depends on adequate field staff and 
knowledgeable, and sometimes creative, technical support services. 
• In the context of what was viewed as a severe field staff shortage, programs should 
focus on encouraging implementation of structural BMPs. Contracts for more 
comprehensive farm management plans appeared to be unenforceable without 
sufficient staff to provide follow up mentoring and monitoring. 
Farmers also revealed, sometimes indirectly, the factors that influence their decisions to 
take on conservation practices: regulation, cost and impact on profitability, convenience, 
pride, and visible improvements in the health and abundance of soil, crops, and livestock. 
These findings are presented under the headings “Incentives & Obstacles to 
Conservation” and “The Critical Importance of Human Resources for Whole Farm 
Management.” 
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Incentives & Obstacles to Conservation Practice 
I’m not really into conservation programs per say. I don’t study it or anything. But if 
it helps the environment and still makes a profit, we’ll do it. 
— comment from a farmer 
 
The motive to sustain high production creates both the reasons for and against the 
adoption of on-farm conservation practices. On the one hand, farmers argued in favor of 
some conservation practices by saying they “benefit the ground and the next generation, 
and increase profits” and that “you want to try to not do any damage, to maintain what 
you had when you got the land.” Other practices, however, especially if they remove land 
from production or involve significant attention that seems only tenuously related to 
production, provoked much greater reluctance. The bottom line appeared to be that if 
conservation is not profitable in the near-term, then few if any would do it unless they 
had to.  
The following outlines factors that prompted farmers to adopt the good stewardship 
practices they have and why they have not adopted other practices. Since all conservation 
practices take place within a regional context, interviewees were asked to identify the 
most important conservation concerns at the outset. A brief summary of their responses, 
immediately below, sets the stage for what was shared about the incentives and obstacles 
to implementing the conservation practices that address these important regional 
priorities. 
Key Conservation Objectives & the Context of Conservation 
Consistent with the conservation objectives of local planning documents, the two primary 
resource concerns emphasized by stakeholders were water quality and soil condition. 
These twin concerns translated into a significant emphasis by both farmers and program 
implementers on nutrient management and erosion control practices, both of which relate 
to the delivery of sediment and nutrients to surface waters and affect soil fertility. Desires 
to advance integrated pest management practices (IPM) and protect wildlife habitat were 
also discussed by a few farmers and implementers. Almost above and beyond anything 
else, however, all stakeholders shared concerns about farm viability and farmland 
preservation. While not central to this study, farm viability profoundly shapes the context 
in which conservation occurs, so I have taken the liberty to share their concerns. 
Virtually all farmers and agency staff had significant experience with and argued for the 
importance of soil conservation. There was little debate about the importance of this 
objective or the value of a whole range of erosion control practices intended to support it. 
Farmers, who felt proud of their stewardship advancements, emphasized the importance 
of no- or minimum-till practices. Other practices recognized as essential to soil 
conservation were the use of cover crops, crop rotations, contour and strip cropping, 
swales, and terraces. As important a strategy as it can be for livestock operations, only 
one farmer and one agency implementer discussed the value of using paddocks for 
management intensive rotational grazing.  
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Stakeholder responses related to nutrient management differed between farmers and 
agency staff. Few farmers identified nutrient management as a significant concern, while 
all program implementers felt it to be a serious concern, especially on livestock 
operations. Agency staff also made clear that this issue is not being adequately addressed 
by producers, even by some of the better stewards, a fact confirmed by the admission of 
several farmers in this study.  
The two major concerns repeatedly discussed were a lack of proper manure management 
and the failure to protect streams from livestock. All implementers eagerly expressed the 
importance of protecting streams from livestock, and some discussed the value of having 
planted buffers that filter nutrients and sediment and shade aquatic habitat. Across the 
board, they also discussed the importance of BMPs to properly store, spread, and 
incorporate manure waste, while acknowledging considerable obstacles faced by many 
farmers.  
To provide context, one program implementer with the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection explained that the southeastern Pennsylvania region is 
experiencing an increasing predominance of livestock and an increase in confined animal 
operations. Driven by cheap grain coming out of the commodity-funded Midwest, the 
relative affordability of hauling feed rather than livestock, and the significant consumer 
market for meat in nearby DC, Philadelphia, and New York, the region is supporting a 
disproportionate amount of animal production. While the livestock operations of 
producers in this study are representative of the size of most operations in the region, 
there are also some very large meat packing and processing plants in the area, one of 
which was responsible for a recent fish kill in a local creek. Consequently, many agency 
staff argued that much progress is needed in managing manure waste on farms.  
They also noted that this challenge cannot be solved with on-farm efforts alone as the 
amount of waste generated by farmers in the region exceeds the acreage available for 
absorbing the nutrients. The additional need for regional solutions, such as a nutrient 
export program (currently underway) or regional composting or incineration operations 
(merely envisioned), were discussed. 
Integrated Pest Management and wildlife concerns were the only other conservation 
objectives mentioned by local stakeholders, and the emphasis on these issues was 
relatively insignificant compared to concerns about the nutrient and sediment impacts on 
water quality. The IPM issue is tied to concerns about the impacts of herbicides and 
pesticides. While the orchard operator and one program implementer were the only two 
to say they would like to see more support for IPM, another farmer and another agency 
staffperson did express concerns about the increased use of herbicides by no-till 
operations. Two farmers and one agency professional also mentioned the importance of 
wildlife habitat on farms, underscoring the point by pointing to the rapid loss of other 
sources of wildlife habitat to development.  
Finally, while the preservation of farmland is not the focus of this study nor directly 
related to the environmental sustainability of agriculture, the issue looms large in the 
minds of those interviewed, especially farmers, for this project. Because discussion of the 
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issue was so pervasive and unanimous and such threats deter farmers from establishing 
new conservation practices, I am briefly covering the issue here.5  
Four of the farmers interviewed expressed frustration about diminishing access to 
farmland and to neighbors who understand and are supportive of the realities of 
agricultural operations. Increasing suburban development, or sprawl, (along with CREP) 
was blamed. One farmer stated, “You can’t run the cows across the road anymore. People 
will lay on their horn. They are all commuting to and from work and don’t want to slow 
down. Things just aren’t laid back anymore. It makes things more stress filled.” 
Another farmer who noted that “they’ve been growing house seeds in the area these 
days” wanted better zoning to “protect the ability to farm and run our machinery and 
animals without having to do it through the middle of a housing development.” A third 
farmer left the county he was raised in since the farmland had been “gobbled by 
development,” and lamented that “development in Berks County is also coming like 
crazy.” And a fifth complained, “People running the townships don’t know about 
agriculture the way they used to.” These demographic changes and real estate pressures 
combine with concerns farmers have about their financial security to make them reluctant 
to invest in new conservation practices. 
Incentives for Soil Conservation 
Most of the farmers were proud of their soil conservation efforts, especially when it came 
to no- or minimum-till farming. All of those who grew field crops had been practicing 
no-till, for ten years since the purchase of the farm in one case to 20-25 years in a couple 
of other cases. While no-till may be a relatively conventional practice for some regions, 
like the grain growing upper Midwest, these farmers saw themselves as forward thinking 
and separate from some of their peers for the practice. All of the farmers also practiced a 
selection of other conventional soil conservation practices such as grassed swales, 
terraces, contour strips, crop rotations, and cover cropping, though some admitted that 
upkeep of these practices lagged intentions. 
The incentives farmers indicated toward these practices included cost savings, time 
savings, and visible improvements of soil fertility and yields. Every farmer felt that their 
soil conservation practices helped prevent topsoil loss, build soil, and sustain the key 
assets of their operations. Enthusiasm for these benefits was particularly evident as 
farmers spoke about reduced tilling. Most cited reductions in fuel use (from tilling) and 
increased yields in drought years as key benefits of no-till. One farmer said that no-till 
saved at least 80% in fuel costs. Another attributed increased yields to better moisture 
retention, saying he gets a crop in dry years when neighbors who still plow get none. 
Another noted that no-till seemed to control weeds (by not exposing weed seeds in the 
soil), saved time, and gave him increased confidence that fertilizer and herbicide sprays 
were not washed away with soil erosion. 
                                                 
5 A study conducted by the American Farmland Trust on long term agricultural viability in Berks and 
Schuylkill Counties provides more in-depth information and recommendations related to this subject 
(American Farmland Trust 2005). 
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While a couple of these farmers had received a degree of technical assistance or cost-
share payments at some point in time, not all did, and all maintained these efforts because 
they provided visible benefits and were economically sustainable—even profitable—
without any form of ongoing assistance. 
Obstacles to Soil Conservation 
In spite of the generally good performance of the farmers interviewed in terms of soil 
conservation, obstacles to complete adoption of many practices were evident. In addition, 
the farmers held that many other farmers were still plowing up their fields and shared 
their perceptions about why this is so.  
Farmers and program implementers attributed the resistance of other farmers who do not 
adopt no-till to three things: transition costs, the conflict of no-till with manure 
incorporation, and the persistence of tradition. Several acknowledged that the cost for 
new no-till machinery can be a barrier. One implementer said the cost of a no-till drill is 
$80,000 - $100,000, and when the future of a farm is uncertain (as is often the case), this 
amount is a very large investment. Another implementer mentioned that during the 
transition to no-till, yield may temporarily decrease and farmers who do not anticipate 
this decline may become frustrated and retreat from adopting no-till. 
On the other hand, the farmers in this study, who clearly took the risk to transition to no-
till did not see the financial barrier as significant. One, who himself was looking at 
retirement, argued that a large no-till drill could be purchased, used, for $50,000 and that 
a smaller used 6-row planter would only run about $23,000. This same farmer said he 
was able to experiment with no-till in a low-commitment way 20 years before by using 
no-till attachments that came with his tractor. An implementer also said that the Resource 
Conservation & Development Council for southeastern Pennsylvania had a no-till drill 
available for farmers to borrow, though it was acknowledged that this resource could not 
support extensive demand.  
The more enduring obstacles to no-till appeared to stem from conflicting stewardship 
objectives and perhaps different ideas about what constitutes good stewardship. Many 
agency staff and farmers agreed with the statement of one program implementer, who 
said, “Old moldboard plowers,6 to their benefit, want to use and incorporate manure 
which seems incompatible with no-till.” In fact, the most committed no-tiller amongst the 
farmers interviewed admitted to wanting to incorporate manure and break up the clay soil, 
which he said he does, but “never more than once per year, and more typically every four 
or five years.” The second-longest no-tiller interviewed also felt that spreading manure 
without incorporating it might cause some nitrogen loss, though “not enough to be 
concerned about as long as streams are buffered.” In the words of one field technician, 
“People are confused about no-till. They don’t understand how you can incorporate 
manure [and still practice no-till].”  
                                                 
6 A form of traditional plowing or tillage 
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Some interviewees also felt that much resistance to no-till was simply resistance to 
change, and particularly to change advocated by government agencies. One program 
implementer described it this way: “In this area, many farmers have operated 
independently of the USDA system and aren’t used to taking assistance and directions.” 
Several other agency staff, who agreed, emphasized the need to involve producers in 
farmer-to-farmer education and demonstration. 
One program employee also reported that many farmers who had off-farm jobs in 
construction or ran construction firms doubted whether soil erosion on farms was really 
significant compared to the huge expanses of soil disturbed for prolonged periods that 
they witnessed on new development sites. “They think that sedimentation from soil 
plowed for a month out of the year on a farm is a marginal contribution compared to 
what’s coming off these construction sites.” 
Obstacles to other types of soil conservation practices also stemmed from financial costs 
and incompatibilities of the conservation practices with other management realities on the 
farm. For instance, one farmer, who said that the area has always supported crop rotations, 
and who typically rotates corn and beans with an alternate crop (wheat, rye, or alfalfa) 
every fifth year, also admitted to exceptions driven by profit potential. “We rarely do 
more than two rotations of corn. When we do, it’s because there is more of a market for 
corn for cattle feed, and soybeans get more disease and less money. On 20 acres, we did 
do corn year after year.”  
Cover crops presented a similar predicament to the no-till vs. incorporating manure 
challenge. Two of the farmers with field crops spoke about the challenge of getting a 
cover crop in after a soybean harvest in spite of their awareness of the need. One said, 
“Soybeans don’t leave much residue like corn and they really need a cover crop, but they 
aren’t ready until November, and at that time it’s hard to get a cover crop to establish.” 
Another confirmed, “The time to establish a cover crop is exactly when we are busy 
harvesting, and after that, it’s too late in the season to get a cover crop to establish. You 
don’t really need a cover crop for corn because there’s enough residue, but it’s an issue 
with soybeans.” This same person saw someone who “rigged up his combine to spin out a 
cover crop while harvesting soybeans,” and said about it, “That was interesting, but it’s a 
lot of expense and work for something that’s not related to my production. It’s hard to 
justify the cost when I’m not certain of the benefits.”  
One farmer also felt that the nitrogen from cover crops conflicted with the goal of 
spreading as much manure as allowable. The texture also made it difficult to spread the 
manure thinly. He acknowledged, “Maybe I just chose the wrong cover crop and it 
burned me? But I don’t have time for experimenting. If NRCS came out and said this is 
the crop that will work for you, okay, [then I would use it].”  
In another instance of conflicts between conservation management recommendations and 
operational efficiency, this same farmer adapted contour strips on his farm to his own 
needs. He found that the recommended 125-foot wide strips led to too much “burning of 
crops” by weed spray along the edge between strips, and doubled the widths to 250 feet. 
One agency implementer said that not only is 250 feet too wide to be effective, but most 
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farmers simply alternate contour strips between corn and soybeans, when alternating 
strips are supposed to contain close-growing, sod-forming crops like alfalfa, barley, or 
oats that actually stop erosion. 
Incentives for Nutrient Management and Riparian Protection 
In spite of the importance of nutrient management7 and stream protection to the health of 
the watershed, incentives to sound practices appear slim, and most farmers in this study 
revealed serious nutrient management problems. The few reasons farmers stored manure 
and protected streams were articulated by one farmer interviewed. Seeking recognition in 
a stewardship competition, this farmer wanted proper manure storage and knew that 
EQIP provided cost-sharing for manure storage facilities in some parts of the country. So 
he waited until EQIP funds were made available locally for manure storage facilities and 
applied the first chance he got.  Though grateful for the benefits of manure storage—it 
“will keep the manure dry which makes it easier to spread, lets me spread it at my leisure, 
and looks cleaner and neater”—he was, nonetheless, reluctant to build the facility at his 
own expense.  
Obstacles to Nutrient Management and Riparian Protection 
The big picture, however, is that farmers in this study were challenged by nutrient 
management expectations—both legal requirements and simple good practices. In this 
study, only the poultry operation and one dairy had manure storage facilities, but the 
other two livestock operations did not. One of them spreads the manure daily throughout 
the year (including on rainy days and on ice and snow), but keeps it outside of a 40-yard 
grass buffer surrounding a stream.  
Of the farmers with manure storage, one admitted that though he generally spreads in the 
spring and fall, he sometimes spreads in the winter. “I try not to spread on snow. But I’m 
not really sure what to think about it because everyone does it. Sometimes you like to 
spread on ground when it’s a little frozen because it supports the weight of the spreader 
better and prevents soil compaction.” As noted, he is not alone in his decision. Several 
producers and agency employees observed the spreading of manure on frozen ground 
throughout the area.  
Several implementers spoke of the lack of enforcement of state nutrient management 
regulations, which impose restrictions of spreading manure near surface water, on frozen 
ground, and in excess. One amazed water quality agency implementer said “Farmers say 
they don’t know what to do with it. Even [the head of a high visibility farmer’s 
organization] talks casually about [his own practice of] spreading manure on frozen 
ground!” Federal regulations to control the most egregious nutrient pollution (i.e. those 
                                                 
7 Nutrient management for a livestock operation involves maintaining a manure storage facility, spreading 
manure only on dry, non-frozen, non-compacted soil (to prevent runoff due to rain or the fact that the 
manure cannot penetrate the soil), and spreading only to allowable nutrient levels according to a nutrient 
management plan. Nutrient management on a cash crop operation involves limiting the use of added 
fertilizers to levels not likely to leach or run-off, according to a nutrient management plan. 
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passed by the EPA that inspired much of the increase in Farm Bill working lands 
expenditures) are also not enforced. 
Several Conservation District and NRCS staff weighed in on the issue of regulatory 
enforcement. In spite of the non-regulatory nature of these organizations and the historic 
tension between their work and that of regulators, they felt that farmers do not seek the 
available technical and financial assistance for nutrient management without sufficient 
regulatory pressure. One said farmers frequently ask, “If I don’t have to, why should I?” 
Two others believed that without regulatory enforcement, farmers see no reason to 
change, and one of them thought that many farmers might not even realize that what they 
are doing is a problem. All of these interviewees, however, urged that increased 
regulatory enforcement be tied to increases in funding for financial and technical 
assistance to farmers. 
In addition, many observed that nutrient management plans, like all conservation plans, 
were not strictly adhered to. One farmer described the challenge of spreading manure as 
thinly as required to meet the expectations of his NRCS nutrient management plan. “My 
fertilizer goal is three tons for manure. I’m close. I’m at about three and half tons. It’s 
hard to get the spreader equipment to apply it as thin as the ideal.” Agency staff indicated 
that this problem is compounded by the fact that some farmers simply do not have 
enough acreage to store and apply the manure waste their operations generate. One noted 
that this puts NRCS and the Conservation District staff in an awkward position—and 
probably is one reason for a lack of regulatory enforcement—since they have no 
guidance to offer to farmers as to how to get rid of their waste. 
Obstacles to riparian protection are also plentiful if not as difficult to overcome as those 
hindering manure management. Agency staff involved with the Schuylkill Action 
Network’s stream protection and restoration work observed that the disincentives to 
implementation include the desire to allow cows access to the drinking water and cooling 
temperatures of the stream, reluctance to take valuable land out of production, needs for 
an alternative water source, and the cost in time and money to maintain the health of the 
riparian zone. 
One farmer interviewed in this study had participated in the CREP riparian program 
which fenced off a 35 foot buffer on either side of a stream, installed a cattle crossing, 
and planted 150 trees and shrubs per acre. Though he seemed unconcerned about the 
cows not accessing the stream—he actually saw the fences as a great value for enclosing 
his pasture—he was burdened by the upkeep of the buffer. He indicated that “it’s hard to 
maintain when it’s not really part of your production.” He went on to explain that NRCS 
monitors the riparian plantings, and that though his performance passed during the review, 
it was a close call. Had they not approved it, he would have had to replant on his expense. 
He complained, “It’s not fair to blame the landowner when what they plant is these tiny 
spindly trees that we have to go out and baby. That’s not realistic. Maybe they should 
spend more money up front for bigger trees and maybe plant less of them so success 
would be more assured and the landowners wouldn’t get screwed.” 
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An agency implementer expressed a similar sentiment: “When we ask farmers to keep 
their cows out of the stream, they see why that’s good, but it’s costly and it may not 
actually improve their operation. So if it doesn’t benefit their operation, then the public 
should help them with it.” One problem with this argument is that it assumes that farmers 
have the right to pollute and that they must be compensated in order to stop. One 
Conservation District employee, at least, saw the potential for profit in reforms, 
explaining that keeping dairy cows out of streams prevents foot rot disease and bacterial 
infections, which in turn increases milk production and reduces veterinary bills. He 
followed this statement, however, with a sense of frustration that sufficient resources are 
not available to increase outreach and education about benefits like these.  
Incentives for Integrated Pest Management 
The fruit farm was actively attempting to reduce chemical usage by replacing pesticides 
with IPM. When asked why, the farmer answered, “Chemical options are disappearing. 
We are losing organic phosphates due to regulations so we need some other kind of 
control. And [my buyer] won’t take any apples if there are worms.” Prohibitions on the 
use of broad spectrum controls and increasing restrictions on the use of pesticides near 
the time of harvest created both costs and logistical challenges for orchard operators. 
Both drove a search for alternatives. When a Pennsylvania State University research 
program offered free IPM technology to participate in their field trials, the farmer took 
the opportunity.  
Since that time, the farm has experimented with isomate ties (twist ties that attach to trees 
and emit pheromones that disrupt the mating of pests) on its own expense account. The 
farmer definitely indicated an attraction to the technological sophistication of IPM (a 
similar unspoken value seemed to support interest in no-till and modern manure storage), 
boasting that IPM technologies “are tested by bona fide scientists, not the Rodale 
Institute.”  
Obstacles to Integrated Pest Management and Wildlife Conservation 
The main obstacle to further use of IPM strategies is cost. Like pesticides, IPM 
technology is expensive. The orchard operator could only afford isomate ties for one type 
of predator since the cost was about $2000 for one season.  
Other issues are also at play too, especially the issue of pride—the pride farmers took in 
having modern or sophisticated operations and in earning income from their business, not 
government grants. For example, the attraction to technological advancement might also 
be a hindrance to further reductions in pesticide use. In spite of a sibling’s encouragement 
to consider organic certification and protect natural areas around the farm as sources of 
beneficial predators, the orchard operator believed organic produce was low-standard 
produce full of worms and that natural areas simply bred more pests.  
The same sibling, who managed the orchard’s accounts and tracked government grant 
opportunities, shared, “I’d hate to have all the other growers see us get all these grants. 
It’s kind of embarrassing.” This comment was reinforced by the orchard operator who 
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indicated a strong preference for business solutions—rather than grants—to IPM and 
profitability. 
At a more basic level, the interviews revealed a lack of concern for the use of chemicals 
in agricultural operations. Though one agency implementer noted that we don’t yet know 
what kind of damage the increased use of herbicides with no-till farming will cause, no 
one else brought up the issue or did anything to reduce herbicide use. It was interesting to 
note that no farmers believed no-till led to increasing use of herbicide sprays, though one 
indicated “using one or two more chemicals to burn off weed foliage” that he did not 
consider herbicides. 
Similarly, though one implementer and two farmers indicated that wildlife concerns are 
important, none but the Christmas tree farmer took any action to protect wildlife habitat. 
Ironically, the passionate and ambitious restoration this landowner was undertaking 
revealed the many disincentives to such work. He was piecing together financial support 
from a number of difficult to discover programs and found it utterly impossible to obtain 
technical assistance from someone who knew “anything about the science of 
conservation.” He was especially frustrated that agency staff often did not know how 
their own habitat conservation programs worked and were advising people to plant 
known invasive plants for erosion control. He felt strongly that “People need to be paid 
for the goods they produce,” and wanted to see more robust cost-share and maintenance 
payments for high quality habitat management.  
The Impact of Farm Viability on Conservation 
We’d like to see open space in the area. And we’d also like to see open space through 
farming. But we are barely making a profit without selling to a developer. We don’t 
know what the future will hold. We’re caught in a squeeze. 
— comment from a farmer 
 
While rapid conversion of farmland to development and the financial vulnerability of 
some operations mainly serve as deterrents to improved stewardship, several farmers and 
agency staff pointed out a flip side—an opportunity that has not been seized. Most of the 
farmers in this study participated to some degree in farmland preservation programs. All 
had enrolled acreage in a local tax break program for farmland, and at least one had sold 
his property’s development rights. Some of the counties in the watershed required 
farmers to obtain NRCS conservation plans upon entering into the county’s farmland 
preservation program, but Berks County was not one of them.  
In addition, the orchard operator, who is actively seeking assistance to diversify the 
operation and free it from an increasingly centralized and inaccessible wholesale market, 
was open to conservation-based production and marketing strategies. However, he had 
not yet been able to find assistance that took an integrative view of business and 
conservation planning. Such farmer vulnerabilities can present opportunities for tying 
conservation to the myriad changes operators are considering to survive.  
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Leveraging the Incentives & Countering the Obstacles: What works? 
Upon considering the questions “what works?” and “what’s needed?” to really encourage 
conservation, farmers and implementers were clear. Voluntary conservation must be 
profitable, or at the very least, not costly. Alternatively, farmers must be required to 
conserve. Farmers measured profitability in more ways than dollars. In such a 
management-intensive business as farming, conservation measures must fit into the 
overall workings of the operation simply and efficiently. Many implementers felt that 
with regulatory burdens already significant for farmers and the survival of many 
operations already at risk, they hoped new regulatory enforcement—which they 
advocated for—would be accompanied by the necessary financial and technical support. 
Farmers were clear too that they valued learning about new ways to be good stewards, 
especially if it increased the efficiency or profitability of their operations. They showed 
the most pride in practices they were not paid to do, but that enabled them to make 
tangible agronomic improvements, remain efficient and profitable, and see themselves as 
intelligent and forward-thinking farmers. One agency employee observed, “The people 
who voluntarily do conservation seem to because they know the environmental and 
business value of the practices and they have the skills to maintain it.” 
To help farmers plan for reforms that can be sustained in this way is a challenging task 
for program implementers. It is one, however, that is consistent with the vision of those 
who advocate for whole farm conservation. What will be required is much more robust 
technical assistance than is currently available through NRCS or its partner agencies. 
The Critical Importance of Human Resources for Whole Farm Management 
Whether talking with the Christmas tree farm owner who needed help planning a 
prescribed burn regime for prairie restoration, the orchard operator who wanted 
assistance exploring alternative business diversification schemes to become more 
profitable, the crop and livestock farmers who were confused about how to get a cover 
crop in after soybeans, alter their manure spreading regime to accommodate cover crops, 
or incorporate manure with no-till, one theme was consistent. These farmers wanted 
much more sophisticated and diverse technical expertise than was available from any of 
the public agencies, especially NRCS.  
Simultaneously, farmers revealed astonishing shortages of even the most basic levels of 
human resources at NRCS. They frequently could not get field staff to come to their 
farms or update conservation plans. No one monitored whether they kept to established 
plans, and many did not. Farmers found it extremely difficult to find out about the range 
of available programs, and were frustrated by spotty outreach, lost applications, incorrect 
information, and general disorganization. And what everyone really wanted was science-
based and business-savvy assistance.  
The push for management-intensive conservation—instead of merely expecting the 
implementation of structure changes—will only make this situation worse. As farmers are 
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expected to keep up a slew of management practices to comply with regulations or their 
CSP contracts, the demands on field staff will increase.  
Severe Understaffing 
Interviewee observations about the current state of NRCS technical assistance painted an 
abysmal picture. Farmers, in particular, expressed disbelief and frustration about the 
understaffing and disorganization at NRCS. For instance, though conservation plans are 
required for any farmer receiving USDA financial support in the form of conservation 
payments or commodity subsidies, four out of the seven farmers interviewed volunteered 
that they have not been able to get a conservation plan (in three years in one case, eight in 
another) or that their plans were drastically out of date. They said this was due to a years-
long waitlist to get an NRCS field worker to come to their farm. Both farmers and agency 
staff cited examples of NRCS turning away farmers interested in plans when the need 
was not perceived to be a high enough priority.  
Many of these same farmers spoke more broadly about how difficult it is to get a staff 
person, from NRCS or any other agency, to actually come to their farm. They also 
complained, universally, about the lack of outreach and the seemingly impossible process 
of keeping track of available programs. Few knew how to identify what programs were 
available and depended on word of mouth from neighbors, a tip from an NRCS agent 
they already had a relationship with, or an advertisement in a local farming publication. 
One described, “When you go in the office, these girls are so stressed out, they can’t 
possibly let everyone know about all of the programs available.” 
Tales of lost program applications and receipt of information about the availability of 
programs only after the application deadlines had passed abounded. One farmer’s WHIP 
(Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program) application was lost by NRCS after the application 
deadline. Consequently, he had to retool his habitat management plans to fit within the 
parameters of the EQIP program. He reported, “I don’t know why they didn’t just let me 
reapply and back date the application like they’ve done before.”  
Another farmer who had awaited EQIP funding for a manure storage facility for years 
reported learning from an NRCS field agent that a new program had become available to 
support this, but that this agent was only provided information about the program by a 
supervisor three weeks after the deadline had passed. The farmer would have to wait 
another year for the next sign up period.  
Both NRCS managers, and Conservation District staff (though not the target of these 
complaints), readily agreed with these concerns and were adamant that they did not have 
enough resources. One manager said, “Farmers need a lot of technical assistance. They 
complain that they can’t get folks to come out to the farm. And here in the agency offices, 
technical assistance is totally underfunded.” Agency staff were particularly upset by a 
trend where federal programs were coming with fewer and fewer funds to pay for the 
costs of implementation. A Conservation District manager called these “unfunded 
mandates,” and explained that “a lot of grants, programs, and legislation are increasingly 
targeting all or most of the funds to the project themselves with very small, or merely 
 
Findings & Discussion   36
temporary, allocations for administration or technical assistance costs.” An NRCS 
employee said, “It’s great that all these programs are available, but there are dwindling 
funds to hire people to implement it all. When funding sources dry up for paying for staff 
time to educate and implement program, then the programs suffer.” 
CSP provided a perfect example of this problem. With a 15% cap on funds for staffing, 
combined with many new program and application processes and little lead time before 
the sign-up, NRCS staff were totally overwhelmed and dropped the ball on many other 
programs during implementation. All agency implementers observed that this trend 
seems to stem from a Congressional idea that money provided for staffing and 
implementation is a drain on the resources provided to farmers. They also argued that the 
results of inadequate staffing are programs poorly implemented and funds poorly spent.  
Additionally, NRCS and Conservation District staff complained that what funding there 
was for technical assistance did not support competitive salaries for competent field staff. 
An NRCS manager argued, “The field staff are the most important people in our work. 
Some of them perform phenomenally with incredible commitment and overtime hours, 
which NRCS is not allowed to pay them for. There is no way to reward them properly. 
We need to be able to offer higher pay grades at the field tech level, so the best field techs 
and the ones who love the work aren’t forced to move out of the field into management to 
earn an adequate salary.” A Conservation District manager cited a recent and typical 
program budget which provided only $32,000 to cover the costs of a stewardship 
coordinator, a figure she described as “totally inadequate to pay for competitive salaries 
with benefits and payroll taxes.” 
These same two managers also complained about the frequency with which they must 
implement brand new programs over very short periods of time. “To get through the start 
up learning curve and be effective, we need more than one year to implement programs. 
Three years should be the minimum for a new program—this would give us enough time 
to get going, do outreach, and implement.” The other raised the same point saying, “Start 
up grants need to be at least three years. Five years would be great,” and added, “But 
afterwards, they still need to offer funds for ongoing program staffing.”  
The result is too few staff attempting to implement too much. Staff everywhere 
complained about the lack of availability of resource lists about programs being 
implemented by other agencies. A Conservation District field technician who felt out of 
the loop on a number of available programs said, “Those who implement the programs 
need to train others to talk about them.” On the other hand, ideas offered like “Techs 
could get supplemental training on local programs to help make farmers aware of these 
programs,” ended with caveats such as “but they are swamped as it is.” 
Prospects for Meaningful Technical Assistance and Management-Intensive 
Conservation 
Against this backdrop, it is no wonder farmers complained that NRCS seemed to be in 
the business of delivering contracts, not of providing technical or planning assistance and 
helping farmers evaluate and address their individual operation’s needs. It is also not 
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surprising that agency field technicians—in stark contrast to the preference of many 
leading policy advocates for management-intensive practices—believed the only 
effective investments were in structural improvements, like streambank fences and 
manure storage, not in management-intensive conservation. They believed that 
encouraging farmers to undertake more comprehensive conservation practice required 
follow-up monitoring and enforcement, never mind creative and knowledgeable technical 
assistance.  
It was felt that investments in structural best management practices (BMPs) assure some 
measure of results without dependence on significant time or knowledge from program 
implementers. One field technician felt very strongly that “[y]ou can’t know if a farmer 
implements a plan. No one’s out there monitoring whether they follow through. Whereas 
with physical BMPs, you know you are getting results.” He added, “Six out of ten 
conservation plans aren’t followed. Sometime farmers don’t even realize that they aren’t 
following what’s in their plan, and other times, there are excuses.” Frequently he sees 
continuous corn on land where the conservation plan specifies a crop rotation, or 
moldboard plowing when it is supposed to be minimum-till.  
Other field staff confirmed this sentiment. Another program implementer explained, 
“Farmers sign contracts and want money, but sometimes they don’t really want to follow 
the rules or implement the plans they signed the contracts on. NRCS writes the contracts 
with farmers, and when they come back to help the farmers install what they agreed to 
install, some farmers seem stunned that you actually expect them to follow through.” A 
third agency staff said, “You hate to spend money on a farm and find out that in five 
years, things are back to the way they were [before the contract].”  
Several Conservation District employees also raised concerns, specifically, about the 
particular challenges of implementing the concept of whole farm planning. It was felt that 
because there is not sufficient technical time and expertise to support this activity, NRCS 
is relying on bureaucratic formulas that distort the intention of comprehensive planning. 
One said, “This seems to translate into NRCS giving preference to prescribing more 
practices even if the costs are higher and the effectiveness lower than choosing just one 
or two practices that would more efficiently solve the problem.” Another corroborated 
this sentiment, saying, “Sometimes it seems like NRCS programs have a slant toward 
meeting quotas—saying how many practices are implemented—rather than actually 
helping farmers [implement the best solutions].”  
As a program intended not simply as cost-share but as an ongoing incentive for ongoing 
stewardship, CSP attempted to solve this problem with a farmer self-reporting process as 
part of the CSP application. One Conservation District technician worried that this 
practice is a dubious substitute for field-based monitoring and support. He cited a call 
from a farmer who asked, “How would [NRCS] know if I’m providing accurate 
information in my records?” He explained, “This is a real problem with record-based 
rather than visible land-based qualification, and raises the complication of how to 
determine with certainty whether day-to-day practices are implemented.” 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the federal program protocols and insufficient human resource 
investments that stymied the kind of creative leadership that could help farmers improve 
stewardship on the farm also stood in the way of regional effectiveness.  
MAXIMIZING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AT THE REGIONAL-SCALE 
Both experts and interview participants agree that at the regional scale, environmental 
gains are more significant when the work of multiple agencies and programs reinforces 
one another, the conservation objectives of programs are narrow and focused, appropriate 
geographic targets are selected based on the potential for improvement, and investments 
are sufficient to cause marked and sustainable reforms. Here are a few of the thoughts of 
program staff: 
The strongest programs have staff that can work cooperatively. You want everyone 
rowing in the same direction. 
— comment from a water quality regulator 
 
Critical mass is essential. It’s a visual thing. When landowners see their neighbors 
install buffers or fences, they will do it too. 
— comment from a county Conservation District employee 
 
Small watersheds are the only level at which you can get visible environmental 
results, but is the investment worth it? After all, there may not even be farms there 
tomorrow! 
— comment from an NRCS employee 
 
Across the board, however, interviewees could identify only one example of regional 
effectiveness—the Schuylkill Action Network (SAN)—and blamed the inflexibility of 
federal rules, programs, and agencies for hindering other strategic regional investments. 
In fact, the discussion of regional effectiveness brought to the surface a litany of 
frustration over seemingly intractable obstacles to shared desires for more locally-
relevant, cooperative, and targeted conservation.  
Starting with the goal of addressing key local concerns, several felt that the only 
organizations able to do this were local groups. While NRCS programs certainly 
addressed water quality and nutrient management concerns, they did not seem to do so in 
a focused way. They also addressed a laundry list of other resource concerns in the 
Schuylkill, diffusing the potential effectiveness of conservation spending.  
One Conservation District employee complained, “There is a problem of the federal 
bureaucracy making a uniform program for the whole country. There needs to be some 
recognition of local and regional needs.” While recognizing the need for program 
consistency and public accountability, several wondered if NRCS program rules could be 
better designed at the state level to support greater variation in local priorities and 
realities. Another interviewee, who saw NRCS staff as administrators and implementers 
of programs, not creators, felt hopeless about NRCS’s ability to exercise the kind of 
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leadership and creativity needed for local and regional responsiveness even if the 
mechanisms were in place to allow it. 
Criticisms of inflexible NRCS rules and culture extended as well to the issue of 
cooperation. Several Conservation District and water quality agency staff who were 
involved with SAN reported challenges attempting to engage NRCS in their work 
developing geographic priorities for and installing streambank protection measures. An 
NRCS employee was defensive about this issue, having felt pressed to share data about 
farms needing improved stream bank protection and believing the agency must not use its 
knowledge in any way that could expose farmers to negative publicity or regulatory 
enforcement. NRCS staff also felt that SAN’s installation of best management practices 
did not comply with the federal standards required for NRCS participation. 
Criticism for inflexibility and difficulty collaborating was not exclusive to NRCS, 
however. The EPA, the other federal agency driving most agricultural conservation 
activity in the Schuylkill and a key player in SAN and many other local initiatives, was 
also blamed. EPA rules were often described as equally inflexible, and several people 
acknowledged the difficult history of trust between the two agencies. NRCS staff, who 
must earn the trust of farmers to operate, are understandably suspicious of jeopardizing 
their reputations by working with a major regulatory agency, and EPA staff have often 
felt frustrated by NRCS’s voluntary approach. Ironically, however, NRCS and 
Conservation District staff were frustrated with the EPA’s lack of regulatory enforcement, 
without which farmers were not driven to seek available programs or implement contracts. 
One participant argued that the only solution to this situation is a federal one, that the 
White House or Congress must mandate closer cooperation between these agencies. 
Unsurprisingly, given the political challenges to maintaining Congressional support for 
geographic targeting, state NRCS staff did not feel they had the discretion to prioritize 
program delivery to particular areas or watersheds. They explained that “regional equity” 
standards prevented geographic targeting, and noted that the only targeting tools they had 
was the ability to rank farms near streams higher among EQIP applications.  
MEASURING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 
The findings, so far, have focused on what participants believe make effective programs. 
Participants were also asked how they knew what made conservation programs effective. 
While farmers focused on the sustainability of conditions at the scale of the farm, agency 
staff who must demonstrate the success of programs tended to look at the question from a 
jurisdictional point of view. All discussed the real challenges to estimating and measuring 
the success of programs. And the discussion with implementers routinely led right back 
to the importance of regional targeting and coordination for achieving outcomes large 
enough to register on any kind of real system of measurement. 
Farmers knew whether conservation measures reduced soil erosion on their properties by 
observation. Some also identified good habitat for wildlife by the presence of certain 
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species. But none had any way to know whether nutrients were leaching into ground or 
surface waters. 
In fact, none of the Farm Bill conservation programs in the Schuylkill included efforts to 
test the environmental results of conservation activities. One NRCS official explained 
that measurability is one of the toughest challenges, indicating that uniform baseline data 
prior to implementation of conservation measures have not been gathered. The challenges 
to measuring the success of nutrient management efforts are particularly and inherently 
problematic, and not just for NRCS. Standard soil tests, often used by fertilizer 
consultants, do not provide reliable information about nutrient levels, as they change 
throughout a season and according to recent weather. Farmers and field technicians did 
suggest that soil, well, and plant tests might be useful for nitrogen monitoring if 
performed as part of a comprehensive evaluation over time, but wondered where the staff 
and technical resources would come from to conduct these tests.  
The most commonly cited example of a potential testing strategy was that used by SAN 
to test the results of their riparian fencing and buffer work. Appropriate for sites adjacent 
to streams, a water quality evaluation—using EPA’s guidelines for wildlife, visual, and 
chemical evaluation—is conducted both upstream and downstream of a targeted farm, 
before and after BMP implementation. One County Conservation District manager 
involved in both the Schuylkill Action Network and the implementation of a number of 
Farm Bill programs, described the inclusion of monitoring into the SAN work as an 
important accomplishment for any agricultural conservation program. 
The performance-evaluation method most frequently used by NRCS is one of estimation, 
rather than measurement. This approach could be valuable, but unfortunately, current 
resources only include reliable tools for estimating soil stability. Several field staff 
identified RUSLE2, a formula for measuring potential soil erosion, as extremely useful 
for estimating the impacts of a set of conservation practices on the farm. And they wanted 
similar tools for estimating the potential efficacy of nutrient management and other 
conservation practices.  
Without other tools, NRCS appears to over-rely on RUSLE2 and other soil condition 
measures. This dependence was evident in the scoring of CSP applications. Because of 
reliance on a soil condition index and the fact that there are no equivalent tools to 
estimate other conservation factors, farms with strong erosion control practices were 
awarded the largest share of CSP payments in Pennsylvania (SAC, 2006a), and in this 
study. A pattern has been observed in other studies (Heller, 2005; Lundgren, 2006) and 
nationally (SAC, 2005) in which CSP farm selection is heavily weighted toward low-till 
operations and away from operations (like organic produce farms) involving soil 
cultivation, in spite of other potential conservation benefits. While many have advocated 
for aggressive national research and development efforts to create reliable indices for 
estimating conservation of resources other than soil (SAC, 2006b; SWCS/ED, 2007b), no 
results have been reported as yet.  
NRCS is undertaking a couple of efforts to estimate program performance, though neither 
has produced results yet that are applicable to program implementation at the field level. 
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One effort is the Conservation Effects Assessment Project (CEAP). Actually lead by the 
USDA in conjunction with other federal agencies, CEAP is an effort to quantify the 
effects of conservation practices in response to the federal government emphasis on 
performance measures and the 2002 Farm Bill’s substantial increase in conservation 
funding. Through research on representative crop fields, grazing lands, and watersheds 
throughout the country, sampling and modeling approaches are being tested for 
estimating the impacts of conservation measures on water quality, water quantity, and 
soil quality. (USDA, 2006b) 
The other change involves how NRCS reports the results of their programs. An NRCS 
manager interviewed touted the shift from “output-based” reporting, i.e. how many acres 
were set aside from production or how many miles of streams were fenced, toward 
“performance-based” reporting. The new reporting system requires implementers to 
convert a concrete practice, such as miles of fence installed, to environmental results, 
such as the volume of nutrients kept out of the stream. The formulas used to convert the 
numbers for reporting purposes, however, do not appear to be used for prescribing or 
evaluating conservation measures in the field. 
Improved measures for performance will take time. Until they are developed, and even 
once they are, NRCS will be confronted with the challenge of encouraging higher levels 
of conservation, especially management-intensive conservation, without sufficient staff 
resources and program flexibility to enable them to address the particular concerns of 
farmers in watersheds like the Schuylkill. It is in this context that this study evaluates the 
potential for stewardship payments to add value to the NRCS conservation portfolio as 
well as the difficulties to success.  
THE VALUE OF GREEN PAYMENTS 
As a program, at least in intent, formed to provide a backdrop of incentives that reward 
and encourage agricultural stewardship, CSP was given special attention in the interviews. 
Knowing that many problems had already been reported about CSP’s performance, I also 
inquired about the values, if any, interviewees found in the program and in the concept of 
green payments reforms. I sought perspectives on what would make a more effective 
stewardship payment program—whether that be a future iteration of CSP or some other 
green payments system. 
The CSP Implementation Process 
According to the watershed rotation established by NRCS to spread CSP around the 
country over an eight to ten year time span (and keep spending within the program 
budget), 2005 was the year Schuylkill River Watershed farmers got their chance to enroll. 
The experience began with the program announcement on March 25, 2005. The sign-up 
period would commence in just three days and last for two months during the height of 
the growing season, from March 28 to May 27. Outreach was rushed and spotty, as it 
only could be in such a short time frame, and the sign-up process was frenzied.  
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Half the farmers in this study learned about the program in a trade journal or local 
newsletter, and the other three heard about it from others, one from an NRCS agent he 
had a relationship with and another from a nutrient management consultant who was 
trying to sign up all his clients (as evidence of the value of his work, this farmer thought). 
Though the CSP outreach was adequate enough to get six of the farmers interviewed in 
this study involved, all farmers interviewed commented that the program did not appear 
to be well publicized and that most people they knew had not heard of the program. 
County Conservation District employees were very concerned about the short timing of 
the sign-up and the limited publicity, noting that many farmers did not know about the 
program or have time to apply.  
Interviewees also described the rush that characterized sign-up. A Conservation District 
employee said that NRCS staff were “putting in a lot of extra hours, seeking extra office 
space for farmers to come in and do applications. They needed volunteer help.” Another 
described farmers who were in the middle of EQIP projects with NRCS who “all of the 
sudden didn’t hear from NRCS staff for a month,” a situation that happened to one of the 
farmers interviewed. Due to the rush, none of the farmers had the time to get their 
landlords to sign the forms that would have allowed them to enroll their rental acreage.  
Interestingly, the rushed implementation did not stop with sign up. Interviews for this 
study were conducted in early August, 2006, during the first week of a six week contract 
modification request period. Some farmers had still not received their notification letters, 
while the others received theirs only a day or two before, after the sign-up period had 
already begun. 
Farmers were “ranked”8 based on the information in their applications, most of which 
came from a farmer’s own records and memory. To keep staff efforts within the capped 
15% technical assistance budget, CSP relied on a “self-certifying” application process. 
One of the County Conservation District field technicians was concerned about this, as he 
got calls from farmers asking “How would they know if I’m providing accurate 
information in my records?” One of the farmers also said it struck him as strange that 
CSP eligibility was basically determined “on your honor.” One NRCS implementer 
complained that though this was meant to save staff time, the process was actually “a 
huge amount of work, and the results were less trusted.” 
Consistent with NRCS’ soil conservation legacy, and due to a lack of indices to estimate 
the impacts of a range of management practices, CSP used a Soil Condition Index (SCI) 
to score applications and to determine payment levels. The result is that farmers with 
good soil conservation practices were selected over those whose conservation practices 
benefited other resource concerns. Heller (2005) and Lundgren (2006) have documented, 
for instance, how the prominence of SCI scores in the selection of CSP applicants 
                                                 
8 I use the term ranked in quotes because ranking was actually prohibited by the CSP statute since the 
program was designed as an entitlement program for all good stewards. Due to an insufficient budget 
allocated by Congress, NRCS was forced to find a means to select applicants. Modeled on a system used by 
the Veterans Administration (as reported by a federal NRCS employee), NRCS used enrollment categories. 
Farmers were placed into categories by a set of criteria, and funds were dispersed to the top enrollment 
category and then each subsequent category until they ran out. 
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resulted in the exclusion of organic farmers who rely on tillage practices to control weeds. 
While the sample of farmers interviewed in this study is small (only 7 percent of all CSP 
awardees in the Schuylkill), it is perhaps no surprise that they were—on the whole—
much more fluent in soil management practices than in other conservation practices. 
CSP contract payments followed a similar pattern. The majority of a contract’s payments 
are called “enhancement payments,” which are dispersed by resource concern: soil 
management, pest management, nutrient management, energy management, and so on. 
Statewide, soil management enhancement payments constituted 43% of all CSP 
payments in 2005 (SAC 2006a). Likewise, 46% of the CSP payments to farmers in this 
study were targeted for soil management practices. In contrast, nutrient management 
payments only made up 7% of the contracts awarded to the farmers in this study. This 
meager investment appears to be inconsistent with the importance of this conservation 
objective for the Schuylkill River Watershed.  
In designing the program, NRCS also chose to offer two levels of enhancement payments. 
Existing practices would receive a diminishing level of payments throughout the 5-10 
year life of the contract. What that means is that a farmer would receive a 100% payment 
in the first year and decreasing percentages for each year thereafter. In contrast, new 
practices—those farmers commit to start at or after the establishment of the contract—
would receive enhancement payments at the 100% level for every year of the contract. 
This schedule of payments was intended by NRCS to motivate applicants and contract-
holders to implement conservation improvements. Whether this is a sound strategy is 
worth careful consideration. Some of the farmer observations that follow suggest that this 
type of payment structure is not what it seems. 
Perpetuating Inequities: Missing CSP’s Unique Potential 
Discussing CSP, and the idea of stewardship payments in general, revealed many 
observations and frustrations about who benefited most from our national agricultural 
income-support and conservation payment system. The consensus from the interviewees 
was that our system generally penalized, not encouraged, good stewardship and was 
downright inequitable to conservation pioneers. Farmers and implementers believed CSP 
was a start, but only that, toward resolving system-wide payment inequities. They also 
noted, with great frustration, that CSP continued some of the inequities that many 
perceived the program was meant to correct. 
The following quotes give a sense of what I heard: 
If you were already doing no-till, you got 100% payment in the first year and 
lowering percentages afterwards. But if you just started no tilling that day, you would 
get 100% each year! That’s the way it was for every enhancement in the contract. So 
the lousiest farmer gets the most money. This is true with other programs too. I 
almost felt like I should go put manure out in the stream to get more money. 
— comment from a farmer about CSP’s enhancement payment structure 
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The guy who is doing a great job wants to participate, but he’s doing too good a job 
to get in. Others who are doing a sloppy job, who don’t care about participating, are 
the ones who can get into the program. 
— comment from a farmer about EQIP’s application ranking criteria 
 
 ‘Why should I do it well when the folks who don’t get all the money?’ 
— a quote about what farmers say to a Conservation District employee 
 
Everyone saw the idea of stewardship payments as inherently good and important. One 
farmer simply said, “CSP has the right idea. You are rewarding people for the good 
things they do…People need to be paid for the goods they produce.” Both NRCS and 
Conservation District staff indicated that they saw a lot of demand for CSP, that farmers 
were looking forward to getting their chance to demonstrate their good stewardship. An 
NRCS manager said that CSP especially had support from “old time conservation 
farmers,” those who practiced good conservation before programs like EQIP came along 
to pay others to adopt what these farmers had already been doing voluntarily. Whether 
the farmers in this study are such conservation pioneers, their experience begins to give a 
sense of what makes stewardship payments really ground-breaking and quite welcome by 
the farming community. 
Study participants saw inequities through the whole USDA system, starting with the 
commodity programs and extending through the conservation programs that provided 
higher payments to lesser stewards. Many could understand that such inequities in the 
conservation programs were driven by the goal to get results at the lowest cost, though 
they were frustrated by this strategy. Several believed that a more equitable stewardship 
payment system might improve conservation outcomes in the long term by supporting the 
type of management practices that involve ongoing costs.  
Everyone interviewed in this study thought the most lucrative financial rewards are still 
for growing commodity crops. And all of those who received commodity payments 
believed that they distort the market and might reduce the prices of their produce as much 
as they help their income. These growers stated that they would prefer to see their profits 
from the market.  
Several also indicated that they think all payments—including commodity payments—
should be tied to minimum stewardship expectations. One farmer insisted that payments 
should never go “to farmers who plow everything up or do idiotic things. A neighbor 
plowed everything up in the fall and left it open all winter until they planted in the spring. 
If you’re doing that, you shouldn’t get a cent.” When asked if this neighbor does, in fact, 
receive commodity subsidies, the interviewee did not know.  
Aside from CSP, EQIP is the dominant program making direct payments to farmers for 
conservation practices. Farmers, conservationists, and policy analysts, by and large, are 
extremely enthusiastic about EQIP. It has provided funds needed by farmers to share the 
costs of new conservation infrastructure and transitions to new management practices.  
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EQIP is criticized by some farmers, however, and it has clear limitations. Farmers who 
already implemented the kinds of conservation measures that EQIP covers using their 
own funds were frustrated to watch their more conventional and less altruistic peers get 
more money. This situation is exacerbated by another strength and liability of the EQIP 
program—its ranking criteria. The demand for EQIP far outstrips the available funds, and 
consequently, NRCS must prioritize applicants most in need of improvements (or, looked 
at another way, currently causing the most environmental damage). A couple of farmers 
in this study complained about the unfairness of this system. 
In addition, as a one-time payment (or only a short-term contract), EQIP is most useful 
for defraying one-time or short-term costs. This cost-sharing is helpful for farmers 
needing to install riparian protection or a manure storage facility, but EQIP fails to 
provide a sufficient incentive for ongoing management practices—such as the cover 
cropping, contour strip farming, riparian vegetation maintenance, and manure 
spreading—that involve ongoing maintenance costs and inconveniences. Farmers will 
only have an incentive to maintain these practices if they are required to through 
regulation or assisted by payments. 
This is the unique value that CSP brings to the workings lands program portfolio. As an 
ongoing stewardship payment, it can provide an incentive significant enough to alter the 
profit potential of ongoing management-intensive conservation practices. Ironically, 
however, CSP’s payment structure works against this potential. As observed by one 
Conservation District employee, declining payments for ongoing practices that do not 
decline in cost do not make sense, just as higher payments for new practices are not 
necessary to build into CSP when CSP farmers can still access EQIP for transition costs. 
And given the perception of farmers that CSP was the program to finally recognize the 
efforts of those that already committed to good stewardship, the unequal treatment of 
enhancement payments—higher payments for new versus ongoing practices—caught the 
attention of every farmer receiving a CSP contract in this study. This inequity infuriated 
several of them. Others simply did not understand the value this inequity had. They all 
said they would adopt new practices so long as they were profitable, and that they would 
consider available CSP and EQIP payments in that decision. A couple wondered how, if 
CSP only provided good payments while practices were new, they could be assured of 
the ongoing payments they would need to sustain those practices over time. 
It seems reasonable to ask, “Why did NRCS design the program this way?” Many would 
answer that since CSP was intended to “reward the best and motivate the rest,” this 
approach is merely a cost effective way to create incentives toward new practices. People 
feared that the majority of CSP funds would be spent on existing practices, and after all 
that spending, we would be left with no new conservation activity. 
CSP Results: Did it “reward the best and motivate the rest”? 
Unfortunately, CSP’s performance confirmed the fears of some: that the program would 
not stimulate new stewardship. Nationally, CSP has been criticized as an investment in 
the “status quo” by Craig Cox of the Soil and Water Conservation Society (Cox, 2007; 
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SWCS/ED, 2007b). And this study offers no evidence to counter that assertion. Farmers 
admitted that they were not motivated to make any substantial changes in their 
management practices because of CSP. One said clearly, “It was absolutely worth my 
time for the money I got paid. But if CSP wasn’t here, nothing would change about my 
operation.” 
This sentiment is not entirely surprising since there was almost no time to apply for CSP, 
nor was there time for farmers to change their conservation practices to become eligible 
for CSP. One conservation District employee argued that CSP could motivate farmers to 
adopt new practices if they knew about the opportunity a few years in advance of the 
sign-up. Another indicated that the program would have to stick around long enough for 
farmers to become aware of the benefits since, apparently, many farmers began asking 
about participating in CSP after they became aware of the kind of payments CSP 
contract-holders received. This interviewee believed the watershed rotation—which 
guaranteed that CSP would not return for at least eight more years—made it impossible 
to “motivate the rest” of the farmers in the watershed.  
What these observers were saying is that CSP needs to have a dependable, ongoing 
presence to motivate the rest. Such criteria seem so obvious, it should almost go without 
saying. And yet, CSP was not implemented this way due to an insufficient budget. 
When I asked NRCS staff about whether CSP motivated new conservation practices, staff 
focused not on whether “the rest” were motivated, but whether the current-contract 
holders (theoretically “the best”) were interested in making additional improvements. 
One said current CSP participants expressed interest in new practices, such as rotational 
grazing, as a result of the educational nature of the application process. My interviews 
with farmers did not support this point of view. Only two farmers were interested in 
making contract modifications, and the modifications they sought involved no additional 
conservation. They both wanted to enroll rental acres left out of the initial contract due to 
application time constraints, and one wanted to get rewards for recycling motor oil, 
something he has always done, but for which he had never gotten receipts until this year. 
The fact that current CSP participants who do have the ongoing option of improving their 
contracts—and in fact, an option which would reward them at a higher rate than for their 
existing practices—were not motivated to do more seems to indicate problems beyond 
the watershed rotation. A clue emerged when farmer after farmer could not recall what 
practices their contracts rewarded them for and what level of rewards they received (CSP 
has three tiers of payments). As it turned out, no farmer interviewed in this study received 
a top tier reward, so all had an opportunity to substantially increase payments. And, as 
noted above, most of the payments were for soil conservation practices.  
This suggests that the actions that must be taken to earn a CSP contract in the first place, 
never mind take steps to improve that contract, are not readily apparent to the CSP 
contract-holders. These farmers had taken steps toward good conservation, but did not 
possess a vision of what top level stewardship could be. And CSP did not articulate a 
clear vision to them to provide something to aim for. This situation also illuminates a 
major obstacle to “motivating the rest.” Even if CSP maintained a continuous presence in 
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the region, if CSP farmers themselves do not know what actions triggered their reward, 
how can “the rest” possibly get a clear idea of what they should do to eventually become 
a CSP farmer? 
In addition to “motivating the rest,” CSP was meant to reward “the best” stewards in the 
nation. It is difficult to imagine that program criteria guaranteed selection of the best farm 
stewards in the Schuylkill. The farmers interviewed were arguably relatively good soil 
conservationists who also had committed to one or two other conservation measures 
(with the exception of the Christmas tree farmer/habitat manager who, though 
comprehensive in his habitat conservation practices, received a meager CSP payment). 
The additional conservation measures implemented by these farmers never amounted to a 
comprehensive treatment of any resource concern. In addition, it appears that some of the 
CSP awardees may not even be in compliance with state and federal nutrient 
management regulations. 
CSP was an intentionally broad program. Its statutory objective is to promote 
“conservation and improvement of soil, water, air, energy, plant and animal life, and any 
other conservation purposes” on “cropland, grassland, prairie land, improved pasture land, 
and rangeland” (P.L. 107-171). Though this objective would seem to allow a lot of 
flexibility and latitude to implementers, it may in fact deprive program implementers of 
needed guidance for effectively targeting the program to a well-articulated, narrow band 
of stewards.  
In fact, though implementers argued that CSP would have to maintain a continuous 
presence to work as an incentive (and not just a reward), they felt that a continuous CSP 
that continued to fund the level of stewardship it currently funds would be inordinately 
expensive. It would.  
Stewardship Payments Through Commodity Reform 
For NRCS employees, musings about the costs of an ongoing stewardship entitlement 
program evolved into the idea that stewardship payments were meant to be an eventual 
replacement for commodity payments. In spite of the fact that CSP, as implemented, has 
not been a clear expression of green payments, NRCS staff clearly held to the notion that 
CSP evolved from the green payments concept of linking income-support to stewardship 
rather than commodity production.  
When I asked farmers what they thought about the concept of an eventual replacement of 
commodity subsidies with something like CSP, they both had strong feelings about the 
commodity subsidies and a degree of support for green payments. One farmer who 
received subsidies said, “If corn and beans brought the price they should, we wouldn’t 
need the commodity programs. But I’d like to see conservation programming that 
rewards me for what I’ve been doing.” Another who received subsidies but felt like the 
system did not sufficiently reward conservation shared, “I’ve never been a fan of the 
commodity program in the first place because it causes more production of something 
that is under-priced and then it pays you for the very problem that it’s creating. But I 
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participate to the fullest, so I’m talking out of both sides of my mouth. I’m not afraid of 
green payments though.” 
Another, who used to rely on commodity subsidies, argued, “If the government would get 
out of the agriculture business, we’d all be a lot better off. If subsidies dried up, land 
would be cheaper for other farmers and cutting down on supply would mean prices would 
go up.” On the other hand, one farmer warned, “Without commodity payments, there will 
be no more agriculture in this nation.” 
Implementers were quick to point out that a move towards a subsidy replacement 
stewardship program is far in the future. One explained, “No one is ready for that in this 
next Farm Bill and the advocacy community would have to be working on it now to get 
something like this in the next Farm Bill. [Green payments] is ultimately going to be a 
really hard sell to those receiving commodity payments. They are not going to support 
losing their commodity payments toward a program they have to compete to get into. All 
you have to do to qualify for commodity payments is plant and attempt to grow grain.” 
While CSP is not the only means to green or stewardship payments, it would be a loss for 
the agricultural community to have come this far and not capitalize on CSP’s greatest 
potential value—to provide a powerful incentive for management-intensive conservation. 
My own belief is that CSP is not likely to expand substantially until it has proven its 
effectiveness as a conservation incentive, so CSP will have to prove itself within a tight 
budget. This fact makes the lessons revealed in the Schuylkill important to the future 
success of CSP and the effectiveness of federal portfolio of working lands programs. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
While the findings in this report came from a relatively small sample of farmers and 
agency staff in one, unique, northeastern watershed, the strong consistency among the 
perspectives of interviewees does reveal a fairly clear picture of the way the portfolio of 
federal working lands conservation programs is functioning locally. In addition, the 
parallels between the issues voiced by interviewees and those raised by policy critics in 
program assessments and 2007 Farm Bill proposals suggest that the themes arising from 
this study are relevant to national policy considerations (Cox, 2007; FFPP, 2007; 
SWCS/ED, 2007a; SWCS/ED, 2007b; SAC; 2006b; USDA, 2006a; USDA, 2007). 
Nonetheless, this study’s findings should not be considered conclusive. The sample of 
interviewees is much too small for that. The findings do, however, represent strong 
hypotheses for further research and evaluation. 
Interview questions focused primarily on perceptions of the effectiveness of working 
lands conservation incentives and the actual or potential value of stewardship payments 
within the portfolio of federal conservation programs. Inquiries about the strengths and 
weaknesses of current conservation incentives, the relevance of federal programs to local 
conservation objectives, the tools for encouraging whole farm or management-intensive 
conservation, and the influence of performance-based and green payments ideologies on 
the local experience elicited several important themes. 
First, study participants had strong opinions about the resource concerns and practices 
that are relevant for their region and concerns about the apparent difficulty of getting 
federal programs to strategically address local conservation objectives in a targeted 
enough way to yield measurable improvements. This appeared especially true for 
resource concerns beyond soil conservation. Second, interviewees also shared deep 
frustrations with NRCS understaffing, the scarcity of on-farm technical assistance, and 
inadequacy of available assistance for the complex challenge of whole farm planning. 
Farmers also consistently expressed a vision for more comprehensive, science-based and 
business-savvy conservation assistance. Third, this study revealed a dearth of meaningful 
program evaluation activity. NRCS appears to be limited by a lack of effective protocols 
and tools to measure the success of adopted conservation practices. For resource concerns 
other than soil management, NRCS does not even appear to employ indices to estimate 
the potential effectiveness of conservation changes.  
Fourth, the question of what kind of incentives motivates farmers to adopt improved 
conservation practices arose on numerous occasions. While there is much academic 
literature on this subject that was not explored in this study, these interviews suggest that 
the current mix of (state- and EPA-driven) regulatory measures and (NRCS) financial 
incentives is not motivating widespread improvements in nutrient management practices. 
Interviewees also raised concerns about the perversity of the Farm Bill’s system of 
subsidies and conservation payments that seems to provide more ample rewards for poor 
stewards than for good ones. Fifth, study participants discussed the problems with current 
stewardship payments (as provided through CSP) as well as the potential values of 
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stewardship payment programs as incentives for broader adoption and maintenance of 
management-intensive conservation efforts. Finally, farmers expressed optimism about a 
future in which farm income support is shifted from rewarding commodity production to 
rewarding stewardship.  
The following asserts six key hypotheses resulting from the findings of this study. 
Effective programs have targeted and locally-relevant conservation objectives. 
1. The current structure of federal programs spreads spending across a broad range of 
resource concerns, diffusing the potential of these programs to initiate substantial 
improvement in any resource area. A narrow band of key conservation objectives 
should guide NRCS program delivery.  
2. To effectively encourage adoption of the conservation practices by farmers, program 
objectives should target the most important local or regional conservation concerns. 
Program delivery should adapt to local agronomic and economic conditions. 
3. To maximize the effectiveness of conservation investments, NRCS should target 
investments to geographic areas most capable of (as determined by existing 
infrastructure and leadership) and most in need of change. 
4. To maximize the effectiveness of conservation incentives, NRCS should have the 
agility to engage in local partnerships to leverage local human resource and 
organizational strengths where they exist. Partnerships currently appear to by 
hindered by rigid agency rules and program delivery protocols and overwhelmed staff. 
Quality technical assistance services are critical and severely underfunded. 
5. NRCS staff resources are inadequate for the basic responsibilities involved in 
delivering the current portfolio or programs: keeping up with the need for farm 
conservation planning as required by conservation compliance measures and all 
conservation programs, conducting reliable program outreach, being accessible for 
on-farm assistance, and maintaining an organized operation.  
6. Program staff indicated that the proportion of funding for the costs of program 
implementation is slipping relative the number and complexity of programs staff are 
expected to implement. They also indicated that top pay grades for field technicians 
are too low to keep dedicated and talented staff in the field. Congress needs to make 
funding NRCS human resources a much higher priority if the agency is to 
successfully deliver programs. 
7. The current level of staffing is a major impediment to the success of management-
intensive conservation. Programs meant to encourage any kind of whole farm or 
practice-based conservation require staff to develop plans, mentor and problem-solve 
with farmers, and monitor implementation. Due to the lack of staff capacity to 
support even meager levels of such activities, many considered programs meant to 
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encourage management changes a waste of money and felt much more confident in 
spending on structural investments. Though there appears to be a federal trend to 
increase payments for management-intensive conservation (SWCS/ED, 2007a, and 
CSP itself), the findings in this study suggest that such investments may be wasteful 
without accompanying investments in human resources.  
8. Farmers are confused by how to integrate conservation practices with other essential 
management activities. Examples include questions about how to get a cover crop in 
after harvesting soybeans, how to spread manure thinly over cover crops, and how to 
properly implement contour strip farming. They need technical assistance to support 
them with these challenges. And many would like assistance with more complex 
challenges.  
9. Farmers also complained about the challenges of tracking available programs and 
identifying the rights source of assistance to meet their needs. They wanted a 
seamless “one-stop-shop” system where they could obtain strategic planning 
assistance for their particular operation and apply for appropriate programs, whether 
in the land retirement or working lands category. 
10. Staff knowledge, skills, and time are also insufficient for addressing additional 
demands for collaborating with other organizations, adapting uniform federal 
programs to local needs, and providing the creative and strategic conservation and 
business planning farmers want.  
Performance-based programs must include performance evaluations. 
11. In spite of 30 years of statutory mandates to focus on resource concerns other than 
soil conservation, NRCS has a dearth of tools to support effective conservation 
improvements targeted to other resource concerns. The agency and its field staff need 
low-cost ranking protocols, indices, and measurement tools for selecting and 
evaluating the management practices it promotes to accomplish objectives beyond 
soil conservation, especially nutrient management and water quality objectives. This 
problem was particularly evident in CSP’s application process. 
12. In contrast to soil management practices, other practices that aim to reduce 
cumulative environmental degradation, such as non-point source pollution, do not 
produce results that are easily measured at the scale of the farm. Therefore, some 
proxy must be developed to provide an indication of a farm’s success in conserving 
resources beyond soil. Without a means to estimate a farm’s conservation 
performance, programs will continue to tie payments to practices, not performance.  
Farmers are motivated by cost, time, and the law. 
13. Farmers are in a management-intensive business where profit margins can be slim. 
They are only likely to make and sustain changes that maintain or increase existing 
profits or if they are required to make those changes by regulations. Conservation 
practices must also be viable against the needs for management efficiency, crop 
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predictability, and soil fertility. Conservation practices that produce visible 
improvements or are perceived as scientifically sound or sophisticated may be 
preferred. In addition, farmers may be more responsive to information about the 
efficacy and profitability of stewardship practices if it comes from other farmers 
rather than from agency staff. 
14. If financial incentives or assistance do not compensate for the cost inherent in some 
conservation practices, whether they be one-time or ongoing costs, such practices are 
less likely to be adopted. 
15. Real estate development and economic pressures that put farm viability at risk 
constitute barriers to interest by farmers in establishing new management practices. 
16. Farmers perceive inequalities in the federal agricultural conservation and income-
support system. There appears to be little relationship between the quality of 
stewardship and the scale of payments, the highest payments sometimes going to the 
worst stewards. This can serve as a disincentive to improved stewardship. CSP 
perpetuated these system-wide inequalities in its own payment structure. 
CSP must be continuous, legible, equitable, and sufficiently staffed to realize its 
potential. 
17. Currently no federal working lands programs provide payments sufficient to promote 
ongoing, management-intensive conservation practices. CSP has unique potential to 
fill this gap in the suite of working lands programs by serving as an ongoing payment 
that can make ongoing, management practices profitable for farmers. To capitalize on 
this potential of the program, Congress must raise the 15% TA cap to ensure 
sufficient planning assistance, field-based evaluation for CSP contract selection, and 
contract monitoring. In addition, NRCS must: 
• eliminate declining payments, 
• ensure contracts are renewable,  
• calibrate payments levels to alleviate the costs of ongoing practices,  
• and target the program to the practices most in need of ongoing assistance. 
18. CSP contracts were provided for a wide range of farmers whose stewardship practices 
were relatively good related to soil conservation, but dubiously “the best” when 
considered against the key water quality conservation objectives in the Schuylkill 
River Watershed. 
19. CSP needs to provide a clear depiction and criteria for selection of “the best” 
stewards (tied to targeted conservation objectives) and reward them first. If local 
implementers do not have the authority or infrastructure to lead this effort, the federal 
rules must provide bold leadership.  
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20. To “motivate the rest,” CSP needs to maintain an ongoing, dependable presence and 
must visibly reward a clear standard of stewardship. If the availability of CSP cannot 
be continuous, at minimum, farmers must be apprised of the opportunity to enroll in 
CSP several years before the sign-up so that they may begin conservation planning 
and implementation.  
21. A payment scheme that equally rewards new and ongoing practices is essential to 
creating an incentive for proactive and ongoing stewardship. 
22. To encourage stewardship practices beyond conventional soil management, CSP must 
incorporate methods other than the Soil Conditioning Index (SCI) to select farms 
where high levels of stewardship have been reached.  
Farmers indicate tentative support for green payment reforms. 
23. There is more openness among farmers in this study to green payments reforms than 
might be anticipated. Farmers were critical of the current system that rewards 
commodity growers over good stewards, and at least wanted to see payments tied to 
more aggressive stewardship expectations. Those that received commodity payments 
expressed a need for continued income support, but showed a preference for 
stewardship-based payments. Perhaps this represents an opportunity to increase the 
rigor of conservation compliance requirements, cautiously and strategically divert 
some funds from the commodity programs to finance expanded conservation 
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APPENDIX A: FARMER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1)  Agricultural Conservation in the Schuylkill 
 
Farm Experience 
• What do you produce?  How many acres?  Do you own this land?   
• Do you receive FSA commodity payments? 
• Do you have income from other sources? 
• How long have you been farming?  What changes have you seen?  What 
changes are good?  What are you sorry to see change? 
 
Conservation 
• What kinds of conservation practices do you implement here?  Are you 
involved in any kinds of farm groups or programs that work on getting more 
conservation?   
• What are the most important conservation issues on your farm?  What about 
other farms in this area?   
• What practices work best for addressing these concerns?  How do you know? 
• What conservation practices have been most widely adopted in your area? 
• What are the main barriers to greater adoption of critical conservation 
practices on your farm?  Or among other farmers you know?  A need for 
technical assistance?  Cost?  Labor constraints?  Market pressures?  
Commodity programs?  Risk aversion?  Rental farming?  Bank loans??? 
• What motivates you toward conservation? 
 
Program Observations 
• There is a great array of programs out there to help farmers promote 
conservation in this region, and there have been so many changes over the 
years – which have you been involved or familiar with? 
• Just for context, in your experience, is NRCS the main agent of agricultural 
conservation in the region, or is some other entity more influential? 
• In your opinion, which programs have (or have had) the greatest conservation 
impact?  How so?  What do you see as key criteria for judging that impact?  
What factors make these programs more successful?  Which do not have 
much value?  What factors make other programs not as successful?   
• Among the array of programs in the region, are there types of programs that 
are really needed?   
 





• How did you find out about CSP?  Did you attend an NRCS workshop on CSP 
prior to applying?  Did you see a copy of the Penn State Extension service 
publication on CSP, and if so, was it useful?   
• What was the application process like?  Did you like the process of filling out a 
farmer “self assessment” booklet?  Was it easy to use and understand?  Did it 
generate questions that you needed to follow-up on with NRCS staff?  NRCS is 
planning on adopting a similar self assessment process for EQIP and other 
conservation programs.  Would you recommend that they continue down that path? 
• What existing conservation practices on your farm do you think most helped you 
qualify for CSP?  Which did not affect your application?  Should they have?  
What do you think of the qualification process? 
• Which tier of CSP are you in?  Which enhancement payments did you qualify for 
under the various categories (soil, water, wildlife, energy)? 
• Letters were recently mailed regarding the sign up (Aug 1- Sept 15) for contract 
modifications – does this process match how you were told it would be?  Are you 
planning to go for contract changes?  Why or why not?  Is the sign up consistent 
with how you were told it would be?   
 
Evaluation 
• Has the contract been worth your time?  What is working really well about CSP?  
What needs improvement?  Ideally, how would you hope for the program to work?   
• What do you think about watershed implementation?  Were you aware of it being 
implemented in the whole watershed? 
• CSP is supposed to be performance-based, or results-based (rather than practice-
based).  Having good conservation results (not just practices) is supposed to guide 
eligibility for the program and is supposed to predict how much you can earn?  
How do you think that was implemented?  Have you participated in or seen any 
other results-driven programs?  How did they work?  How do you recommend 
ways to show the results of conservation practices?  Do you think there are ways 
that you or other farmers can do themselves so that they would know how they 
are doing or whether they qualify for more payments?  Do you have experience 
with on-farm water quality or wildlife monitoring?  If there was an option to 
participate in this, would you? 
• Did CSP cover the right types of conservation systems and activities?  If not, 
which should have been covered?  Would you scratch any from the list?  Do you 
think CSP should have covered management intensive rotational grazing, organic 
transition, crop rotations?  What about alternatives like direct marketing or agro-
tourism? 
• The concept of rewarding farmers who already practice conservation, versus 
paying for new BMPs, was very controversial.  What do you think of this? 
• Overall, in your opinion, what value does CSP have relative to other NRCS or 
other conservation programs?  Would you like to see it back in the Schuylkill?  
Expanded?  Changed? 
• Are you aware of the green payments concept and the WTO pressure to eliminate 
commodities (this is long term, of course)?  Do you think there is a better way to 
replace commodities than how CSP is trying to do it? 
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• If you were to allocate dollars among programs, which would get the most?  The 
least?  Would CSP be on that list?  Why? 
 
3)  Lessons for the Future 
 
• How do you shift the incentives toward conservation, to counter all the other 
pressures on farmers to focus on the short term? 
• What lessons would you want to see incorporated into the way agricultural 
conservation programs are developed in the future?  What is needed? 




APPENDIX B: NRCS IMPLEMENTER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1)  Agricultural Conservation Programs in the Schuylkill 
 
Involvement 
• How did you become involved with NRCS or agricultural conservation work? 
• What are the most important resource concerns/conservation issues on farms 
in this watershed?  What are the highest priority conservation practices or 
conservation systems for addressing the most important concerns/issues? 
• What are the main barriers to greater adoption of the critical conservation 
practices or systems among farmers?  Lack of knowledge or experience?  Cost?  
Labor constraints?  Market pressures?  Commodity programs?  Risk aversion?  
Rental farming?  Bank loans??? 
• What motivates farmers toward conservation? 
 
Program Observations 
• There is a great array of programs to help farmers promote conservation in 
this region, both within NRCS and in the larger community – SAN, for 
instance.   
• In your opinion, which programs really stand out for having the greatest 
conservation impact?  How so?  What do you see as key criteria for judging 
that impact?  What factors make these programs more successful?  What 
factors make other programs not as successful?   
• Where do you see needs for improvement?  Either in particular programs or 
other broader challenges. 
• Among the array of programs in the region, are there types of programs that 
are really needed?  Resources that are badly needed to expand existing efforts?  
What are the obstacles? 
• Have you seen any changes in the strategies or emphasis of NRCS 
programming or the agricultural conservation work of other organizations 
since you’ve been involved?  
 
2)  CSP 
 
I know this was a difficult program to implement with constrained timelines and 
resources.  My questions here are both to hear your perspective on CSP 
implementation, but also to discuss more broadly the potential of some of the very 
unique features of the statute.  Let’s start with implementation. 
 
Implementation Feedback 
• What was successful about the program?  Who do you think benefited?  What 
environmental outcomes do you think that translates to?   
• What was difficult and ineffective about the program?  What were the missed 
opportunities?  What changes do you think would improve the program? 
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• Do you have ideas about how you’d implement that payment structure or 
application process? 
• As implemented, were there any unique characteristics about CSP relative to 
other programs?  What value, if any, do these have? 
• As implemented, what value, if any, does CSP have relative to other programs? 
• Would you put more funding into CSP in the future, or less?   
 
The Statute 
• How familiar are you with what didn’t get implemented?  With ideas that 
were in the statute that didn’t make it through the complications of 
implementation and funding cuts? 
• So did you know about…? 
o Green payments – That CSP was influenced by this concept of 
eventually replacing the income support of commodity payments with 
conservation payments that pay more based on greater environmental 
benefits.   
o That there was an entitlement aspect, prior to the underfunding of the 
program  
o The Performance-based concept – that unlike other federal 
conservation programs, like EQIP which allows adoption of practices 
“a la carte,” CSP requires participants to adopt a combination of 
practices that “solve” a conservation issue.  Which of course raised the 
question of how to measure results. 
o That there were supposed to be greater rewards for farms that choose 
their conservation priorities and conduct their farm planning in 
conjunction with local or regional conservation efforts.   
 
Conceptual Feedback 
• So, did you see any promise in the statute that didn’t survive implementation?  
• Pulling these pieces apart, I’d love to mine your experience for insights, ideas, 
models, or lessons that could be useful as future policies that use these 
concepts are shaped. 
o Performance-based programs – Have you seen programs that are good 
examples of ones where assessment of actual environmental progress 
was built in?  How did it work?  How else could results be gauged or 
demonstrated?  Management intensity factors?  Indices?  On-site 
monitoring?  Water quality monitoring?  Modeling?  Do you know 
how to make these transparent so a farmer can determine their own 
eligibility for the program? 
o Watershed-based programs – What value does this concept have?  
What problems are caused by having a county-based agency 
implement based on watersheds?  Are those problems or barriers 
surmountable? 
o Entitlement programs/Rewarding existing conservation systems and 
practices – This has been really controversial about CSP and very 
difficult to fund.  What do you think about this?  In your opinion, if the 
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program continues on a watershed rotation basis, what it the maximum 
number of years between sign-ups for anyone to be motivated to 
prepare to participate? 
o Collaboration – In what ways has cooperation or resource-sharing 
been really successful in the region?  Are there certain local assets – 
knowledge, institutional relationships, plans, monitoring infrastructure 
– that would add a lot of value to new programs?  What are the 
barriers to greater collaboration and resource sharing?  How is the 
relationship between local NRCS offices in the Schuylkill and the 
community of water quality regulators and environmental advocates?   
 
3)  Lessons for the Future 
 
• How do you shift the incentives toward conservation, to counter all the other 
pressures on farmers to focus on the short term? 
• To which existing programs or new priorities would you direct funding in the 
future?  If you were to imagine a program…. 
• What lessons would you want to see incorporated into the way agricultural 
conservation programs are developed in the future? 




APPENDIX C: NON-NRCS AGENCY STAFF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1)  Agricultural Conservation in the Schuylkill 
 
Involvement 
• What is your involvement with agricultural conservation work in the 
Schuylkill?  How did you become involved? 
• What are the most important resource concerns/conservation issues on farms 
in this watershed?  What are the highest priority conservation practices or 
conservation systems for addressing the most important concerns/issues? 
• What are the main barriers to greater adoption of the critical conservation 
practices or systems among farmers?  Lack of knowledge or experience?  Cost?  
Labor constraints?  Market pressures?  Commodity programs?  Risk aversion?  
Rental farming?  Bank loans??? 
• What motivates farmers toward conservation? 
 
Program Observations 
• There is a great array of programs to help farmers promote conservation in 
this region – which are you familiar with? 
• In your opinion, which programs currently have the greatest conservation 
impact?  How so?  What do you see as key criteria for judging that impact?  
What factors make these programs more successful?  What factors make other 
programs not as successful?   
• Among the array of programs in the region, are there types of programs that 
are really needed?  Resources that are badly needed to expand existing efforts?  
What are the obstacles? 
 
2)  NRCS Programs 
 
• Do you have any contact with the work of NRCS?  Are they perceived as the 
main agent of agricultural conservation efforts in the region?  Are there 
institutions/programs that are of equal influence? 
• What works best about NRCS programs?  What needs improvement?   
• Have you seen any changes in the strategies or emphasis of NRCS 
programming since you’ve been involved?  
 
3)  CSP 
 
Describing the Statute 
My questions here are not mainly to assess the performance of that program, but 
to have a conversation about some of the very unique and potentially progressive 
features of the statute that gave birth to the program.  I don’t want you to feel like 
you need to evaluate that which you aren’t familiar with.  I mostly want to talk 
with you about some concepts that influenced the statute and may show up again 




Can I tell you a bit about the program’s original goals? 
• Green payments – It came out of the idea of eventually replacing the income 
support of commodity payments with conservation payments that pay more 
based on greater environmental benefits.  This is by no means going to happen 
tomorrow or with CSP specifically but there is a movement and CSP was 
influenced by it. 
• With CSP, the green payments concept resulted in an entitlement program 
aspect (“reward the best”) – Due to a shortage of NRCS staff and technical 
assistance dollars and CSP funding cuts made by Congress, this original 
vision was modified.  
• Unlike other federal conservation programs, like EQIP which allows adoption 
of practices “a la carte,” CSP requires participants to adopt a combination of 
practices that “solve” a conservation issue.  This is referred to as being 
performance-based – that the goal is not the practice, but the result – so if that 
takes a whole combination of practices, fine.  The challenge is that tools to 
measure these results, whether they be on farm monitoring or some sort of 
index for predicting soil loss or non-point source pollution, are still being 
developed in many ways – it’s not always obvious or agreed upon as to how 
to do this. 
• Related to this, CSP was supposed to be implemented at a watershed-scale so 
that the results of the changes could be measured.   
• There was even a piece that said the program should offer greater rewards to 
farms that choose their conservation priorities and conduct their farm planning 
in conjunction with local or regional conservation efforts, i.e. groups like SAN! 
 
Conceptual Feedback 
• I’m curious what your response is to all that?  Is this news that CSP had any 
of these intentions?  Do these seem like promising program concepts?  Did 
you happen to see any of these concepts come through in implementation?   
• Pulling these pieces apart, I’d love to mine your experience for insights, ideas, 
models, or lessons that could be useful as future policies like CSP are shaped. 
o Performance-based programs – Have you seen programs that are good 
examples of ones where assessment of actual environmental progress 
was built in?  How did it work?  How else could results be gauged or 
demonstrated?  Management intensity factors?  Indices?  On-site 
monitoring?  Water quality monitoring?  Modeling?  Do you know 
how to make these transparent so a farmer can determine their own 
eligibility for the program? 
o Watershed-based programs – Have you encountered this in other 
programs?  What value does this concept have?   
o Entitlement programs/Rewarding existing conservation systems and 
practices – This has been really controversial about CSP and very 
difficult to fund.  What do you think about this?   
o Collaboration – In what ways has cooperation or resource-sharing 
been really successful in the region?  Are there certain local assets – 
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knowledge, institutional relationships, plans, monitoring infrastructure 
– that would add a lot of value to new programs?  What are the 
barriers to greater collaboration and resource sharing?  How is the 
relationship between local NRCS offices in the Schuylkill and the 
community of water quality regulators and environmental advocates? 
 
Implementation Feedback 
If you know about CSP implementation and are comfortable sharing your 
perspective, I have a few questions. 
• What was successful about the program?  Who do you think benefited?  What 
environmental outcomes do you think that translates to?  What was 
accomplished? 
What were the missed opportunities?  What changes do you think would 
improve the program? 
• Did any of its unique characteristics that we discussed show up? 
• What value do these accomplishments have relative to other programs?   
 
4)  Lessons for the Future 
 
• How do you shift the incentives toward conservation, to counter all the other 
pressures on farmers to focus on the short term? 
• To which existing programs or new priorities would you direct funding in the 
future?  If you were to imagine a program…. 
• What lessons would you want to see incorporated into the way agricultural 
conservation programs are developed in the future? 
• Is there anything else you would like to tell me that I haven’t asked about? 
 
 
